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INTRODUCTION 
hina is believed to have the world’s largest exploitable re-
serves of shale gas, however, several legal, regulatory, envi-
ronmental, and investment-related hurdles will likely restrain its 
exploitation. China’s capacity to face these hurdles successfully 
and produce commercial shale gas will have a crucial impact on the 
regional gas market and on China’s energy mix, as Beijing strives 
to meet growing energy demand, and, at the same time, maintain a 
certain level of resource autonomy by decreasing its reliance on 
C 
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imported oil and coal. The development of the unconventional 
natural gas extractive industry would also provide China with fur-
ther negotiating power to obtain more advantageously priced gas. 
This article, which adopts a comparative perspective, under-
lines the trends taken from unconventional fuel development in 
the United States, emphasizing their potential application to 
China in light of recently signed product-sharing agreements 
between qualified foreign investors and China. The wide range 
of regulatory and enforcement problems in this matter are in-
creased by an extremely limited liberalization of gas prices, lack 
of technological development, and barriers to market access 
curbing access to resource extraction for private investors. This 
study analyzes the legal tools that can play a role in shale gas 
development while assessing the new legal and fiscal policies 
that should either be crafted or reinforced. It also examines the 
institutional settings’ fragmentation and conflicts, highlighting 
how processes and outcomes are indeed path dependent. These 
issues are exacerbated by many concerns. One such concern is 
related to the risk of water pollution deriving from mismanaged 
drilling and fracturing. Another concern is the absence of ade-
quate predictive evaluation regulatory instruments and industry 
standards, entailing consequences for social stability and envi-
ronmental degradation, which are inconsistent with the purpos-
es of sustainable development. Moreover, the possibilities of co-
operation and coordination (including through U.S.-China com-
mon initiatives), and the role of transparency and disclosure of 
environmental data are assessed. 
The significant growth in the production of natural gas from 
shale formations constitutes one of the most important develop-
ments in the energy sector. This growth was made possible by the 
reduction of production costs and overcoming of technological bar-
riers. Recent advances in fracturing (also known as “fracking”) 
and horizontal drilling technologies have led to a dramatic in-
crease in shale gas production in the United States, which has 
resulted in energy experts describing shale gas as a “bridge fuel” 
to carbon-free renewable resources as the United States’ primary 
582 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2 
source of energy.1 The U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA)  
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     1. On the strategic relevance of shale gas in the United States, see Howard 
Rogers, Shale gas—the Unfolding Story, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 117 
(2011); Steffen Jenner & Alberto J. Lamadrid, Shale Gas vs. Coal: Policy Im-
plications from Environmental Impact Comparisons of Shale Gas, Conven-
tional Gas, and Coal on Air, Water, and Land in the United States, 53 
ENERGY POL’Y 442 (2013). An interesting comparative analysis between shale 
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estimates a 49 percent growth in global marketed energy  
consumption by 2035.2 Unconventional fossil fuel energy re-
sources will grow approximately 4.9 percent per year up to 2035.3 
Furthermore, shale formations are found in almost every region 
of the globe; thus the potential for shale gas development is of 
great importance.4 
Although shale gas represents a revolutionary element in the 
global energy framework, several regulatory and environmen-
tal concerns related to both its extraction and production pro-
cesses have been raised, in particular about the use of hydrau-
lic fracturing fluids and the consequential risk of drinking wa-
ter contamination.5 As the “shale gas revolution” taking place 
in the United States has highlighted, human health and envi-
ronmental concerns continue to dog shale gas development.6 In 
                                                                                                                            
gas development in China and the United States was carried out by Joshua 
Harvey and Yang Min in the framework of the Vermont Law School-China 
Partnership for Environmental Law. In particular, see Joshua Harvey & 
Yang Min, The Unconventional Promise and Problems of Shale Gas Develop-
ment in the US and China: A Comparative Study, VLA-CHINA PARTNERSHIP 
ENVT’L L., May 13, 2011, at 1. 
 2. That is, compared to a 2007 prerecession baseline. The EIA predicts 
that unconventional fossil fuel energy resources will grow at approximately 
4.9 percent per year until 2035. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., International En-
ergy Outlook 2010, DOE/EIA-0484(2010), at 1–9  (July 2010), 
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2010/ph240/riley2/docs/EIA-0484-2010.pdf. 
 3. See, e.g., Stephen A. Holditch, The Increasing Role of Unconventional 
Reservoirs in the Future of Oil and Gas Business, 55 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 34, 
34 (Nov. 2003) (defining conventional reservoirs of oil and gas as “those that 
can be produced at economic flow rates and that will produce economic vol-
umes of oil and gas without large stimulation treatments or any special re-
covery process,” whereas Holditch defines unconventional reservoirs of oil 
and gas as those “that cannot be produced at economic flowrates or that does 
not produce economic volumes of oil and gas without assistance from massive 
stimulation treatments or special recovery processes and technologies”). 
 4. Christophe McGlade et al., Unconventional Gas–A Review of Regional 
and Global Resource Estimates 55 ENERGY 571, at 12–14 (2013). 
 5. Hydraulic fracturing implies the high-pressure injection of millions of 
gallons of water-based hydraulic fracturing fluids to increase the permeabil-
ity of the rock by holding the fractures open. Fracturing fluid is a mixture of 
about 90 percent water, 9.5 percent sand, and 0.5 percent chemical additives. 
See generally EPA, Hydraulic Fracturing Research Study, 2010. For a com-
prehensive overview of the legal rules governing the management of drinking 
water, see generally Richard J. Lazarus, Crystals and Mud in Nature, 18 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 134 (2006). 
 6. Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water 
Accompanying Gas-well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L 
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that respect, given the global scope of its potential, it is crucial 
to ensure that the development of shale gas resources will be 
carried out in an environmentally sound manner.7 
China is aware of the importance of unconventional gas as a 
carbon-friendly energy source and pivotal element in achieving 
the country’s future energy and environmental objectives. As it 
is the country with the largest increase in greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions, China’s capacity to substitute coal with 
cheaper gas as its primary electricity-generating fuel has the 
potential to represent a huge step toward global warming miti-
gation.8 However, China lacks comprehensive legal instru-
ments capable of addressing the potential environmental haz-
ards of shale gas extraction, and suffers from weak enforce-
ment of environmental laws and regulations.9 
This article begins with Part I examining the implications of 
shale gas on the world’s energy market and its relevance re-
garding energy security, the recent vast increase in shale gas 
production, and its potential for China’s energy mix and sup-
ply. In Part II, the article investigates the current Chinese reg-
ulatory framework, which lacks cohesive and satisfactory pro-
visions regarding shale gas extraction. Specifically, Part II will 
examine the institutional shortcomings that hinder effective 
                                                                                                                            
ACAD. SCI. 8172 (2011); David M. Kargbo et al., Natural Gas Plays in the 
Marcellus Shale: Challenges and Potential Opportunities, 44 ENVTL./ SCI. & 
TECH. 5679 (2010); Charles W. Schmidt, Blind Rush? Shale Gas Boom Pro-
ceeds Amid Human Health Questions 119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A348 (2011); 
Robert W. Howarth et al., Natural Gas: Should Fracking Stop?, 477 NATURE 
271 (2011). 
 7. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Frac-
turing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation 20 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 116 (2009); Eleanor Stephenson et al., Green-
washing Gas: Might a ‘Transition Fuel’ Label Legitimize Carbon-intensive 
Natural Gas Development?, 46 ENERGY POL’Y 452 (2012). 
 8. See generally Choi Ieng Chu et al., The Current Status of Greenhouse 
Gas Reporting by Chinese Companies: A Test of Legitimacy Theory, 28 
MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 114 (2013); Mingde Cao, Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Reduction, 43 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 52 (2013); Zhu Liu et al., Uncovering China’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emission from Regional and Sectorial Perspectives, 45 
ENERGY 1059 (2012); Lorraine Sugar et al., Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Chinese Cities, 16 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 552 (2012); Hong Huo et al., Projection 
of Energy Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Motor vehicles in China: 
Policy Options and Impacts, 43 ENERGY POL’Y 37 (2012). 
 9. See infra, Part II, for a discussion about the Chinese institutional and 
regulatory framework. 
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enforcement of environmental provisions, the pricing and fiscal 
regime, and the current barriers to foreign investment access 
to the Chinese energy market, which strongly counters China’s 
need for technology and know-how. This analysis points out 
that there are no Chinese laws that explicitly tackle the envi-
ronmental risks of the fracking process. Part III discusses criti-
cal concerns about fresh water management vis-à-vis uncon-
ventional gas.10 These two natural resources have come to be 
complexly linked because the extraction, treatment, and distri-
bution of fresh water entail considerable energy, while the pro-
duction of fossil fuel energy involves fresh water. 
Part IV discusses the similarities between China and the 
United States regarding shale gas. Shale gas is a pivotal ele-
ment for the energy future of both countries, where energy se-
curity, energy efficiency, and environmental concerns are deep-
ly intertwined. Their regulatory frameworks are not completely 
dissimilar, as both have far-reaching federal or central laws 
enforced by designated agencies. Furthermore, both countries 
exhibit a gap between the formulation of federal/central law 
and their enforcement at the local level. The similarities be-
tween the U.S. and Chinese energy systems allow for the draw-
ing of parallels, which could be beneficial to the Chinese shale 
gas industry. In that perspective, this article argues that the 
current applicable Chinese legal framework is neither suffi-
cient nor satisfactory, given what is at stake. In particular, it 
questions how shale gas can represent a transitional fuel to re-
newable energy resources. 
Part V discusses how shale gas radically impacts supply and 
demand of the world’s energy mix and market, how new geopo-
litical factors must be assessed, how economic and demographic 
growth will increase pressure on global energy supplies, and, 
as a result, how all fuel sources will have to be exploited. This 
article concludes that a comprehensive legal and regulatory 
change is necessary in order to foster an environmentally 
sound development of the shale gas sector in China. This 
change would be conducive to the need to increase energy secu-
rity, to achieve the country’s future energy and environmental 
                                                                                                                            
 10. For a wider debate on the carbon footprint of unconventional gas, see 
Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon Affect-
ed and Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 3, 7 (2010). 
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objectives, and to ensure beneficial economic growth and social 
development. 
I. THE REVOLUTIONARY ROLE OF SHALE GAS THROUGH THE 
PRISM OF CHINA’S ENERGY MIX: THE GROWTH OF A NEW 
INDUSTRY 
The potential for shale gas development is currently being 
explored in several countries.11 Shale gas is found in unconven-
tional reservoirs, from which natural gas is extracted from the 
low permeable source rock itself using a combination of tech-
niques such as hydraulic fracturing12 and horizontal drilling,13 
which create fissures in the rock allowing the gas to flow more 
easily through it. In addition to shale gas resources, there are 
other types of unconventional gas reservoirs: tight gas14 and 
coal bed methane (“CBM”).15 That said, the present article fo-
cuses on shale gas due to recent enormous increase in shale gas 
                                                                                                                            
 11. Shale gas development is currently being explored in several countries, 
and shale gas reserves have been identified in some European countries and 
in Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, India, Pakistan, 
and China. 137 exploratory drilling operations are currently underway in 
China and in parts of South America, particularly Argentina. 
 12. For a definition of “hydraulic fracturing,” see Hydraulic Fracturing 
Research Study, supra note 5. 
 13. Horizontal drilling involves drilling a vertical well to the desired depth 
and then drilling laterally to access a larger portion of the reservoir. George 
E. King, Apache Corporation, Hydraulic Fracturing 101: What Every Repre-
sentative, Environmentalist, Regulator, Reporter, Investor, University Re-
searcher, Neighbor and Engineer Should Know about Estimating Frac Risk 
and Improving Frac Performance in Unconventional Gas and Oil Wells (SPE 
Hydraulic Fracturing Technology Conference, February 6-8, 2012). 
 14. Tight gas refers to natural gas that is trapped in sandstones. For the 
significance of this energy source in China, see Dai Jinxini et al., Tight Gas in 
China and Its Significance in Exploration and Exploitation, 39 PETROLEUM 
EXPLORATION & DEV. 277 (2012). 
 15. CBM is a natural gas that is produced from coal seams, which act as 
the source and reservoir for natural gas. Historically, China’s focus has been 
on CBM, but recently its focus has shifted towards developing its shale gas 
resources. Yumin Lv, Dazhen Tang, Hao Xu & Haohan Luo, Production 
Characteristics and the Key Factors in High-Rank Coalbed Methane Fields: A 
Case Study on the Fanzhuang Block, Southern Qinshui Basin, China,  96 
INT’L J. COAL GEOLOGY 93 (2012). The term “unconventional gas” is used here-
in to indicate shale gas, which has been acknowledged as the most promising 
unconventional gas. 
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production and its potential for China’s energy mix and sup-
ply.16 
 
Figure 1. Illustrative diagram of fracking and horizontal drill-
ing operations. 
A. A Transition Toward a More Sustainable Future? 
Shale gas is widely referred to as a “bridge fuel,” implying its 
capability to eventually replace hydrocarbons with carbon-free 
renewable resources as a primary source of energy.17 This con-
                                                                                                                            
 16. China’s potential unconventional gas reservoirs are significant, alt-
hough many still need to be more precisely estimated. The political support of 
shale gas is also relevant, and the Chinese Ministry of Land and Resources 
(“MLR”) announced “a strategic goal of reaching a production target of 15–30 
BCM (billion cubic meters) by 2020.” See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, MEDIUM-TERM 
OIL & GAS MARKETS 185 (2010). To achieve this goal, China must, inter alia, 
acquire fracking technology and expertise. The state-owned company Sinopec 
has already launched dialogue with international oil companies in further-
ance of this goal. What is more, in November 2009, China and the United 
States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) to jointly cooperate 
in assessing China’s shale gas resources and foster investments in this sector. 
See id. at 185, 188. 
 17. See Noam Lior, Sustainable Energy Development with Some Game-
Changers, 40 ENERGY 3, 4 (2012). See generally Hanna Mäkinen, Shale Gas–a 
Game Changer in the Global Energy Play?, 1 BALTIC RIM ECON. 31 (2010); 
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cept acknowledges that renewable resources cannot replace 
hydrocarbons as a primary generating fuel in the near term, 
and that, while shale gas remains a hydrocarbon, it has less 
detrimental consequences on the environment than other fossil 
fuels.18 In that respect, it appears that at the moment, renewa-
ble resources are less cost competitive than fossil fuels, in par-
ticular natural gas.19 
Moreover, in addition to their high costs, renewable resources 
present further downsides, including the need for installing 
thousands of miles of new transmission lines requiring onerous 
investments and burdensome regulatory approvals. With the 
European Union and the United States examining ways to de-
velop electricity projects that use renewable resources to gen-
erate electricity and to market the electricity produced by such 
projects, it appears that they mainly rely on the continued 
availability of federal and state subsidies and state-renewable 
resource portfolio mandates.20 Given the ongoing global finan-
                                                                                                                            
Amy Myers Jaffe, Shale Gas Will Rock the World, WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303491304575187880596301
668; PAUL STEVENS, THE ‘SHALE GAS REVOLUTION’: HYPE AND REALITY (2010); 
Martin Wolf, Prepare for a Golden Age of Gas, REAL CLEAR MARKETS, Feb. 22, 
2012, 
http://www1.realclearmarkets.com/2012/02/22/prepare_for_a_golden_age_of_
natural_gas_123804.html. 
 18. See generally STEVENS, supra note 17. 
 19. It costs two to five times as much to generate electricity through the 
use of renewable resources such as solar and wind as through use of gas. Fur-
thermore, given that most renewables can generate electricity exclusively on 
an intermittent basis, a unit of electricity generated through the use of a re-
newable resource is worth only about 25 percent as much as a unit of electric-
ity generated through the use of gas. Paul L. Joskow, Comparing the Costs of 
Intermittent and Dispatchable Electricity Generating Technologies, 100 AM. 
ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 238 (2011); Paolo D. Farah & Elena Ci-
ma, Energy Trade and the WTO: Implications for Renewable Energy and the 
OPEC Cartel, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 707 (2013). 
 20. Manuel Frondel et al., Economic Impacts from the Promotion of Re-
newable Energy Technologies: The German Experience 
(Ruhr Economic Papers, No. 156 (2009); Richard Schmalensee, Evaluating 
Policies to Increase Electricity Generation from Renewable Energy, 6 REV. 
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 45 (2012); Mark A. Delucchi & Mark Z. Jacobson, 
Providing All Global Energy with Wind, Water and Solar Power, Part I: 
Technologies, Energy Resources, Quantities and Areas of Infastructure and 
Materials, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1170 (2011); Keith Williges et al., Making Con-
centrated Solar Power Competitive With Coal: The Costs of a European Feed-
in Tariff, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 3089 (2010); Paul Lehmann & Erik Gawel, Why 
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cial recession, however, those subsidies and mandates are un-
likely to be granted in the future. Rather, many EU countries 
have already either reduced or eliminated those subsidies.21 
On the other hand, the replacement of coal with natural gas, 
including shale gas, as a generating fuel reduces emissions of 
carbon dioxide. Hence, the expression “bridge fuel” reflects the 
expectation of many policy makers that we can achieve mitiga-
tion of climate change in the near term by replacing coal with 
natural gas, while eventually entirely replacing all hydrocar-
bons with carbon-free renewable resources in the long term.22 
Clearly the practicality of this scenario is dependent on the 
ability to take adequate measures to guarantee society that 
hydraulic fracturing of shale basins can be carried out with low 
environmental costs. 
China is likely to benefit greatly from shale gas. The Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that China will consume 
more gas than the entire EU by 2035.23 As it is the country 
                                                                                                                            
Should Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity Complement the EU Emis-
sions Trading Scheme?, 52 ENERGY POL’Y 597 (2013). 
 21. For instance, Portugal and Spain made the extraordinary decision of 
reneging on the long-term commitments they made to renewable resource 
projects by retroactively eliminating their subsidies. This way, the two Iberi-
an countries saved many billions of Euros in the efforts to avoid defaulting on 
their sovereign debt. 
 22. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas: A Long Bridge to a Promising Des-
tination, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 245 (2012). See also Daniel P. Schrag, Is 
Shale Gas Good for Climate Change?, DÆDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., 
Spring 2012, at 72. On the other hand, unconventional natural gas produc-
tion is noted for its potential for significantly large quantities of methane 
leakage, which is a potent GHG. During oil and gas production processes, 
fugitive methane emissions are most commonly leaked or intentionally vent-
ed at the wellhead, and from pipes and valves. Merisha Enoe et al., Lessons 
Learned: A Path Toward Responsible Development of China’s Shale Gas Re-
sources, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, Aug. 2012, at 1, 6, 
http://www.nrdc.cn/phpcms/userfiles/download/201208/16/Lessons%20Learne
d%20-
%20A%20Path%20Toward%20Responsible%20Development%20of%20China
%E2%80%99s%20Shale%20Gas%20Resources.pdf. For an argument that 
dynamic governance innovation can facilitate climate-energy-water balancing 
to address natural gas governance gaps, see Elizabeth Burleson, Climate 
Change and Natural Gas Dynamic Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 25 
(2013). 
 23. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ARE WE ENTERING A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS?: 
WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, at 8 (2011), 
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with the largest source of GHG emissions and the largest 
source of increase in GHG emissions, China’s capacity to sub-
stitute coal with cheaper gas as its primary electricity-
generating fuel has the potential to represent a huge step to-
ward global warming mitigation.24 
However, relying on shale gas introduces the risk of neglect-
ing investments in renewable energies. Some critics say that 
the industry’s focus on developing shale gas and other uncon-
ventional sources is diverting attention and capital from the 
development of renewables because low-cost power is generated 
from copious natural gas supplies, which could frustrate the 
economic viability of wind, solar, and geothermal projects, and 
eventually delay the shift to renewable energies by many 
years.25 Indeed, in the United States, shale gas as a source of 
low-priced electric power created a more difficult competitive 
environment for new wind projects.26 Similarly, the IEA sug-
gests that the effect of falling gas prices due to increased shale 
gas development could hamper the viability of low-carbon al-
ternatives.27 Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that 
it is not certain that gas prices will remain low if shale gas 
must meet tighter regulatory criteria. Additionally, the ulti-
mate price competitor in the power sector is not gas, but coal 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2011/weo2011_goldena
geofgasreport.pdf. 
 24. For a scientific perspective on the fact that a significant part of recent 
global warming is driven by the accumulation of anthropogenically derived 
greenhouse active gases in the Earth’s atmosphere, see John Dodsonn, Intro-
duction, in CHANGING CLIMATES, EARTH SYSTEMS AND SOCIETY, at xix (John 
Dodson ed., 2010). 
 25. In light of the great potential for investments in carbon markets, re-
newable energy sources, and low-carbon technologies, it is clear that interna-
tional investment, renewables, and climate change are interdependent con-
cepts. On this point, see generally Kate Miles, Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law Inau-
gural Conference, Issues in the Transition to a Low Carbon World (July 2, 
2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1154588. 
 26. See generally DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY SECURITY AND THE 
REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (2011). 
 27. This was confirmed by the chief economist of the IEA, Fatih Birol, who 
stated, “if gas prices come down, that would put a lot of pressure on govern-
ments to review their existing renewable energy support policies . . . . We 
may see many renewable energy projects put on the shelf.” Fiona Harvey, 
Natural Gas is No Climate Change ‘Panacea’, Warns IEA, GUARDIAN (June 6, 
2011), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jun/06/natural-gas-
climate-change-no-panacea. 
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(and, for base load capacity, nuclear, and hydropower). On this 
point, Jenner and Lamadrid remark: 
the crucial challenge in order to achieve grid parity is to meet 
the coal price. This objective can be approached from two 
sides: increased cost effectiveness of renewable energies and 
storage solutions by further technological innovation; or in-
ternalization of the cost of carbon into the price of coal. Both 
ways are relatively independent from the shale gas issue.28 
In other words, “shale gas holds the potential to smoothen the 
transition to an age of renewable energies but we must be 
aware of the potential of low gas prices to cause temporarily a 
spike.”29 
Extreme reliance on natural gas would equally frustrate the 
efforts to maintain fuel mix diversity in the power sector, leav-
ing ratepayers, utilities, and the economy as a whole vulnera-
ble to the hazards of commodity price volatility. In that sense, 
substitution of natural gas for other fossil fuels cannot be the 
exclusive means to tackle GHG emissions and climate change, 
given that natural gas is itself a fossil fuel. Further comple-
mentary actions are then needed in order to have a reasonable 
chance of meeting climate goals.30 To this end, low-carbon in-
vestments, renewable energy deployment, carbon capture and 
storage technologies, and energy efficient measures must be 
prioritized in the international energy governance agenda. An-
other critical step in the right direction would be the estab-
lishment of a carbon tax that would allow negative externali-
ties related to fossil fuels not to be priced by society.31 Finally, 
                                                                                                                            
 28. S. Jenner & A.J. Lamadrid, supra note 1, at 449. On the internaliza-
tion of the cost of carbon into the price of coal, see generally, David M. Drie-
sen, Putting a Price on Carbon: The Metaphor, 44 ENVTL. L. 695 (2014); David 
M. Driesen, The Limits of Pricing Carbon, 4 CLIMATE L. 107 (2014). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Instead of being thought of as competitors, however, natural gas and 
renewable energy sources should be seen as complementary, not competitive, 
components of the power sector. Natural gas plants can quickly scale up or 
down their electricity production, and thus can act as an effective hedge 
against the intermittency of renewables. CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, LEVERAGING NATURAL GAS TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS, at vii (2013), http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/leveraging-natural-
gas-reduce-ghg-emissions.pdf. 
 31. William D. Nordhaus, To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to 
Slowing Global Warming, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. POL’Y 26, 26 (2007); Liang 
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further actions would require the development of a real-time 
pricing mechanism for electricity32 and the reduction of direct 
releases of methane into the atmosphere during the extraction 
process. Emissions of methane are mainly caused by “flowback” 
of the water forced into the rock formation during fracking, and 
by leaks in processing and during transportation.33 Recent 
studies suggest that these losses can be limited by the use of 
the best technology, but cannot be completely avoided.34 In that 
respect, it is crucial to measure precisely GHG emissions from 
both natural gas production and consumption in order to min-
imize emissions along the entire natural gas chain.35 As tech-
nologies for producing shale gas continue to advance and the 
industry grows in scale, wider collaboration on research and 
development issues is required among governmental agencies 
and international energy governance institutions. 
In light of the aforesaid, a growing body of scientific research 
questions how shale gas could ever be a transitional fuel that is 
able to shift society from its current overreliance on fossil fuels 
to a greater use of sustainable renewable energy, given its car-
bon intensity and the level of investment needed.36 Further-
                                                                                                                            
Qiao-Mei et al., Carbon Taxation Policy in China: How to Protect Energy-and 
Trade-Intensive Sectors?, 29 J. POL’Y MODELING 311, 312 (2007). 
 32. Mark G. Lijesen, The Real-Time Price Elasticity of Electricity, 29 
ENERGY ECON. 249 (2007); Stephen P. Holland & Erin T. Mansur, Is Real-
Time Pricing Green? The Environmental Impacts of Electricity Demand Vari-
ance, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 550 (2008); Hunt Allcott, Rethinking Real-
time Electricity Pricing, 33 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 820, 820 (2011). 
 33. CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, LEVERAGING NATURAL GAS TO 
REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 22 (2013), 
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/leveraging-natural-gas-reduce-ghg-
emissions.pdf. 
 34. Recent scientific research indicates that relying on shale gas could in 
fact be as harmful to the climate as reliance on coal. Robert W. Howarth et 
al., Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale 
Formations, 106 CLIMATIC CHANGE 679, 686–87 (2011). 
 35. Indeed, natural gas is not carbon free. On the contrary, it releases 
emissions by its combustion. Moreover it contains methane (CH4), a potent 
GHG, whose release during production, transmission, and distribution may 
offset the beneficial climate outcome of shale gas use. 
 36. On this point, Nobuo Tanaka, executive director of the IEA, stated, 
“While natural gas is the cleanest fossil fuel, it is still a fossil fuel. Its in-
creased use could muscle out low carbon fuels such as renewables . . . an ex-
pansion of gas use alone is no panacea for climate change.” See Harvey, supra 
note 27. Indeed, according to studies carried out by the IEA, the development 
of the shale gas industry would put our CO2 emissions on a “trajectory con-
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more, shale gas would most likely involve costly regulation. 
Provided that natural and shale gas prices remain low, there 
will be fewer inducements to invest in greener sources. Hence, 
in order to satisfy their carbon-reduction targets, there is a risk 
that governments could force the energy industry to make 
these investments through regulation, which would greatly 
augment costs across the entire oil and gas industry, and result 
in repercussions on highly cost-sensitive shale gas investments, 
projects, and operations. 
B. China’s Stake in the Shale Gas Saga 
Shale gas is already revolutionizing the world’s energy mar-
kets and industry. Vast deposits are being discovered through-
out the world. China is aware of unconventional gas’s role as a 
carbon-friendly energy source and pivotal element in achieving 
the country’s future energy and environmental objectives: in-
creasing energy security, decreasing GHG emissions,37 and 
ameliorating domestic air quality while simultaneously em-
powering the country to pursue beneficial economic growth and 
social development.38 A 2013 assessment of international shale 
gas resources issued by the U.S. EIA39 estimated technically 
                                                                                                                            
sistent with a probable temperature rise of more than 3.5 degrees Celsius in 
the long term.” INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN 
AGE OF GAS 91 (2012), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/weo2009/. See gen-
erally David M. Driesen, Phasing Out Fossil Fuels, 38 NOVA L. REV. 523 
(2013); Jody Freeman, A Critical Look at “The Moral Case for Fossil 
Fuels”, 36 ENERGY L.J. 327 (2015). 
 37. According to the Kyoto Protocol’s emission-reduction obligations, the 
Chinese government announced on November 25, 2009, that China’s unit 
GDP CO2 emissions will decrease by 40 to 45 percent from 2005 to 2020. 
Margret Kim & Robert Jones, China’s Energy Security and the Climate 
Change Conundrum, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, 2005, at 3, 6; Deng Haifeng, 
Legal Interactive Mechanism on Climate Change: A Comparative Study of 
China and U.S. Experiences, 8 US-CHINA L. REV. 431, 431–44 (2011); Paul 
Howard, Harmony in China’s Climate Change Policy, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND GROWTH IN ASIA 177 (M. Hossain & E. Selvanathan eds., 2011). 
 38. For a prediction of Chinese energy consumption and carbon dioxide 
emissions in a scenario of the all-inclusive well-off society in 2020, see Wei Lu 
& Yitai Ma, Image of Energy Consumption of Well Off Society in China, 45 
ENERGY CONVERSION & MGMT. 1357 (2004). On the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and social development, see, for example, Gheorhe H. Popescu, 
The Social Evolution of China’s Economic Growth, 1 CONTEMP. READINGS L. & 
SOC. JUST. 88, 90 (2013). 
 39. The EIA is an independent arm of the U.S. DOE. 
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recoverable shale gas resources in China at 1115 trillion cubic 
feet,40 nearly 50 percent more than resources in the United 
States.41 In reality, China’s national oil companies have al-
ready commenced shale gas exploratory drilling with the tech-
nical and financial assistance of joint ventures 
with multinational companies such as Total, BP, and Royal 
Dutch Shell.42 The rigid structure of China’s state-controlled oil 
and gas industry hampers efforts to exploit reserves, because 
the current absence of competition between the three state-
owned energy giants (China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), Sinopec, and PetroChina) is not conducive to a fair al-
location of resources. In that sense, the country’s current ener-
gy regulation is characterized by overregulation of the energy 
market, a fragmented system of regulation, and insufficient 
environmental regulation.43 Moreover, numerous Chinese in-
vestments in North American shale basins illustrates Beijing’s 
concrete commitment to exploring the potential of shale gas 
resources, as China is exponentially building its shale gas ca-
pacity in order to achieve energy security and influence in the 
world’s gas-pricing regimes.44 What emerges is a growing Chi-
                                                                                                                            
 40. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TECHNICALLY RECOVERABLE SHALE OIL AND 
SHALE GAS RESOURCES: AN ASSESSMENT OF 137 SHALE FORMATIONS IN 41 
COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 6 (2013). See also Li Shizhen, The 
Status of World Shale Gas Exploration and Development and Implications for 
China, 6 GEOLOGICAL BULL. 918 (2010). 
 41. China has an estimated 1115 Tcf of risked, technically recoverable 
shale gas, located mainly in marine- and lacustrine-deposited source rock 
shales of the Sichuan (626 Tcf), Tarim (216 Tcf), Junggar (36 Tcf), and 
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for shale gas production of 5.8 to 9.7 Bcfd by 2020. See McGlade et al., supra 
note 4. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Xin Qiu & Honglin Li, Energy Regulation and Legislation in China 42 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10678 (2012). 
 44. Globally, States engage in multilateral or bilateral inter-State rela-
tions to pursue energy security, while building up extensive reserves that 
inevitably impact on the world’s oil and gas supply. Paolo Davide Farah & 
Piercarlo Rossi, National Energy Policies and Energy Security in the Context 
of Climate Change and Global Environmental Risks: A Theoretical Frame-
work for Reconciling Domestic and International Law through a Multiscalar 
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nese engagement in international relations in order to guaran-
tee a steady energy supply for its ever-increasing domestic 
needs.45 At the moment, natural gas demand continues to ex-
ceed supply, making China a net importer; but, at the same 
time, domestic production has been burgeoning,46 increasing 
the share of natural gas in total energy requirements from 2 
percent to 4 percent, and expected to reach 8 percent by 2015 
and 10 percent by 2020.47 
However, after assessing the development of the shale gas 
industry in China, one can see that the current applicable legal 
framework is neither sufficient nor satisfactory given what is 
at stake. China must still adequately delineate a policy frame-
work regarding pricing mechanisms, energy regulation, and 
physical infrastructures, as well as management of environ-
mental risks that may be connected to the development of its 
unconventional gas resources. The exploitation of natural re-
serves is a strategic sector for national security and, in that 
sense, is highly sensitive to political influences and extremely 
prone to State intervention. The central government firmly 
controls shale gas blocks by granting exploration rights and 
                                                                                                                            
and Multilevel Approach, 20 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 232, 232–34 
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 45. Andreas Goldthau, Energy Diplomacy in Trade and Investment in Oil 
and Gas, in GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE: THE NEW RULES OF THE GAME 25, 
25 (2010). 
 46. China augmented natural gas domestic production from 27.2 billion cu-
bic meters (bcm) in 2001 (approximately 106 percent of domestic consump-
tion) to 94.5 bcm in 2010 (approximately 89 percent of domestic consumption). 
Given the continuously increasing domestic need, China is also imple-
menting its energy infrastructure network. In that respect, the 4200-km 
West-to-East pipeline was built to transport gas from Xinjiang Province in the 
west to Shanghai, and the TransAsian pipeline was opened in 2009 to bring gas 
from Turkmenistan to China. Moreover, four liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) 
receiving terminals were brought online, allowing LNG to meet some 10 per-
cent of Chinese gas demand. A few more LNG receiving terminals are under 
construction. See McGlade et al., supra note 4; Ruud Weijermars & Crispian 
McCredie, Assessing Shale Gas Potential, PETROLEUM REV., Oct. 2011, at 1. 
 47. Boqiang Lin & Ting Wang, Forecasting Natural Gas Supply in China: 
Production Peak and Import Trends, 49 ENERGY POL’Y 225, (2012); Guy CK 
Leung, China’s Energy Security: Perception and Reality, 39 ENERGY 
POL’Y 1330 (2011); OIL AND GAS RESOURCES IN CHINA: A ROADMAP TO 2050 
(Guangding Liu et al. eds., 2011); Junchen Li et al., Forecasting the Growth of 
China’s Natural Gas Consumption, 36 ENERGY 1380 (2011). 
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organizing auctions. The first round of tendering for shale gas 
exploration rights in June 2011 was held in the form of an invi-
tation tender, and only State- and province-controlled oil and 
gas enterprises were able to bid on the gas drilling projects, 
namely, China National Off-shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 
Sinopec, PetroChina, Yanchang Petroleum, China United 
Coalbed Methane Corporation, and Henan CBM.48 The exclu-
sion of foreign companies from being eligible to obtain produc-
tion licenses was possibly aimed at retaining control over the 
scope of investments and the production ratio. The second 
round of tendering was held in October 2012, which opened 
bidding to state-owned enterprises in other industries as well 
as privately-held Chinese investment entities (Sinochem and 
Zhenhua Oil) in order to foster greater competition and innova-
tiveness in the infant shale gas industry.49 However, the Chi-
nese government still has enormous leeway in deciding which 
enterprises can access its shale gas industry, and the entry of 
non-state Chinese companies will not change this situation giv-
en that these entities continue to rely on cooperation with 
State-controlled PetroChina, which owns and runs the national 
transmission network.50 Nevertheless, foreign companies are 
neither able to bid nor act independently for either extraction 
or infrastructure projects, as they are merely allowed to oper-
ate under approved joint ventures with Chinese firms. Domes-
tic companies apply for permits to explore and develop sites, 
after which they can enter into partnerships with foreign in-
vestors.51 
State-owned enterprises such as CNPC and CNOOC can ac-
quire specific technical skills by investing in North American 
shale gas companies and establishing joint ventures. For in-
                                                                                                                            
 48. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., China – International Energy Data and 
Analysis (May 14, 2015), 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Chin
a/china.pdf. 
 49. Cameron McKenna, Shale Gas: Legal Developments in Some Key Ju-
risdictions Across the Globe, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0e5143b6-f9d2-45b0-bbeb-
bd8805b6a572. 
 50. Christina Larson, China’s Shale-Gas Potential and Peril, BLOOMBERG 
BUS. WEEK, (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-04-
18/chinas-shale-gas-potential-and-peril. 
 51. KPMG GLOB. ENERGY INST., SHALE GAS: GLOBAL M&A TRENDS 11 
(2012). 
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stance, Shell and CNPC have partnered in digging more than 
thirty gas wells in Middle Sichuan Province, and discovered 
shale gas in Fushun-Yongchuan Block, which is considered the 
first commercial shale gas project in China.52 The two compa-
nies signed the first production-sharing agreement approved 
for foreign involvement in the shale gas sector.53 Usually for-
eign oil and gas companies seek to join product sharing agree-
ments (“PSAs”), which represent the classic form of contracting 
of oil and gas resources. Similarly, Statoil, ConocoPhillips, BP, 
Chevron, and Exxon Mobil have entered into joint study 
agreements with Chinese national oil companies and they are 
likely to transform their agreements into PSAs later on.54 
In a PSA, an international oil company is more of a partner 
in the venture, and shares both the resulting oil and control of 
the operation either directly or through a joint-operation body. 
PSAs can be beneficial to governments of countries that lack 
the expertise and capital to exploit their natural resources and 
wish to attract foreign companies to do so. An international oil 
company usually shares the resulting profits and oil/gas, but is 
obligated to pay not only royalties but also income tax on its 
share. An alternative method to approaching the market is to 
acquire or enter into a cooperation agreement with a local oil or 
gas field service provider. 
The principal technique to foster production and use of un-
conventional natural gas is through government-set goals and 
mandates, which State-run entities, with some participation 
from private companies, pursue with projects and adequate in-
vestments. The vast participation in the aforementioned ten-
ders reflects the market enthusiasm concerning the potential of 
the shale gas industry. However, lack of experience will carry 
relevant hindrances on shale gas exploitation in China. Lack of 
                                                                                                                            
 52. Unconventional Oil & Gas Resources, CHINESE NAT’L PETROL. CORP., 
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 53. Shell committed to contributing at least $1 billion each year for the 
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598 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2 
technology, equipment, a competitive market, and transporta-
tion networks, coupled with blind investment and over exploi-
tation, are the common challenges to economic development in 
China. Furthermore, a great number of enterprises entering 
the market at once might cause excessive production capacity, 
industrial structure imbalance, and uncontrolled environmen-
tal pollution. Additionally, the concerns related to land availa-
bility, lack of supply chains, and foundation facilities will bring 
more challenges to shale gas exploitation in China. 
It remains to be seen what the implications will be in terms 
of environmental costs. Shale gas is obtained through hydraulic 
fracturing, a controversial extracting technology which creates, 
as highlighted by the shale gas boom that took place in the 
United States,55 critical environmental threats, namely con-
tamination of freshwater aquifers by fracturing fluids and de-
pletion of local water supplies. In China, these obstacles to the 
mature development of the country’s unconventional gas re-
serves are augmented by two deeply intertwined hurdles: the 
absence of a comprehensive legal framework specifically ad-
dressing the potential environmental hazards of shale gas pro-
duction, and weak enforcement of relevant laws and regula-
tions. Acknowledging the importance of shale gas as a bridging 
source of energy in the shift from fossil fuels to clean energy, 
the primary need is to minimize environmental damages relat-
ed to the process of shale gas extraction and achieve the goal of 
extracting shale gas in an environmentally responsible way, 
which is mainly a matter of regulation and enforcement. In the 
last decade, the United States has taken the lead in explora-
tion, development, technology, production, and export of shale 
gas. Consequentially the U.S. experience could be helpful for 
other countries, such as China, which wish to develop their 
own shale gas industries. 
                                                                                                                            
 55. Pulitzer Prize-winning energy author Daniel Yergin remarks how 
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II. CHINESE INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The current Chinese regulatory framework lacks cohesive 
and satisfactory provisions regarding shale gas extraction and 
its related environmental concerns. There appears to be a gen-
eralized absence of cohesiveness in the energy-resources sys-
tem, which is characterized by institutional fragmentation and 
conflicts of interest among a plethora of entities. The Chinese 
legal system features a tripartite structure: the National Peo-
ple’s Committee passes laws; the State Council passes regula-
tions; various ministries create rules; and departments within 
the ministries create other legislative documents. In the con-
text of shale gas production, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP) plays a fundamental role as it is responsible 
for enforcing environmental laws through its provincial and 
municipal subsidiaries. Another fundamental body is the Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which 
oversees the National Energy Administration and sets broad 
environmental standards and long-term goals that are regulat-
ed and enforced through provincial and municipal-level 
branches of the MEP.56 
A. Regulation of the Shale Gas Industry in China 
Regulation of the shale gas industry is horizontally frag-
mented and jointly undertaken by at least six authorities at the 
ministerial level, including the NDRC, Ministry of Land Re-
sources (MLR), Ministry of Finance (MOF), MEP, Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MOST), and the State Administration 
of Taxation (SAT). The presence of many regulators carries the 
risk of conflict and makes the allocation of competences un-
clear. What emerges from an initial analysis is that the NDRC 
is in charge of shale gas industrial policies and planning, which 
covers targets, transportation, consumption, and pricing.57 
MLR is responsible for public tenders of shale gas blocks and 
the setting of thresholds for entry.58 MOF and SAT jointly de-
termine tax incentives, such as grants and preferential fiscal 
policies.59 MOST works on improving and developing technolo-
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REPUBLIC OF CHINA (3d ed. 2004). 
 57. Lee, supra note 54. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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gies for the Chinese geological environment, while MEP has 
strategic relevance as a supervisor and sets minimum stand-
ards for underground and surface water protection, wastewater 
treatment and recycling, air pollution, and protection of species 
of animals and plants.60 
There are currently no Chinese laws that explicitly tackle the 
environmental risks of the fracking process. Moreover, alt-
hough shale gas development is part of China’s current Five-
Year Strategic Plan, the Chinese government has neither 
passed legislation nor provided any guidance for shale gas ex-
ploration, market application, and strategic planning.61 Despite 
this, several existing laws, if broadly interpreted, might be ap-
plied. However, these existing laws are neither exclusively con-
cerned nor purposely drafted to deal with shale gas. In particu-
lar, the most pertinent law regarding shale gas production and 
its potential environmental perils is the Water Pollution Pre-
vention and Control Law (WPPCL),62 which sets central and 
local water standards to which local governments must adapt 
their regulations within a “cooperative federalism” frame-
work.63 This legal tool provides a number of measures aimed at 
protecting drinking water64 and forbidding the construction of 
drainage outlets in specific areas. Article 38 of the Water Law 
lays down that “protective measures shall be taken . . . while 
constructing underground engineering facilities or carrying out 
underground prospecting, mining, and other underground ac-
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tivities.”65 The expression “other underground activities” cer-
tainly includes the fracturing process. Furthermore, the Water 
Law prohibits the discharge of a number of chemicals usually 
used in American fracturing fluids,66 while allowed pollutant 
discharges are capped at fixed amounts.67 
Although the WPPCL constitutes a fundamental tool in rela-
tion to the issues analyzed in this article, its coverage is still 
limited. While it requires that the State establish and improve 
compensation mechanisms for ecological protection of the water 
environment in drinking water source areas and reservoirs by 
instruments such as payment of transfers, no supporting laws 
and regulations currently exist.68 Furthermore, the WPPCL 
contains some ambiguous provisions and lacks any definition of 
the authority of the local governments, creating a vacuum that 
frustrates the effectiveness of the regulatory framework.69 The 
WPPCL permits the governments of provinces, autonomous 
regions, and municipalities to establish their own standards for 
items not set by a central body, and includes strong punitive 
measures to be imposed upon violators who can be fined and 
ordered to remediate the damage they have caused.70 In partic-
ular, in the amended WPPCL promulgated in February 2008 
and effective on June 1, 2008, stricter penalties against viola-
tors were added to enhance law enforcement.71 Nevertheless, 
without detailed guidelines for implementing the law, effective 
enforcement of those stricter penalties remains unfulfilled. 
                                                                                                                            
 65. Id. art. 38. 
 66. Such chemicals include “any oil, acid, or alkaline solutions or highly 
toxic liquid waste” or “any highly toxic soluble waste residue containing mer-
cury, cadmium, arsenic, chromium, lead, cyanide, etc.” Id. arts. 29, 31. 
 67. Id. art. 18. 
 68.  RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 72 (Tianbao 
Qin ed., 2015). 
 69. On the authority of local governments on environmental issues in Chi-
na, see Alex Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental 
Law and Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L.R. 365, 429 (2013). 
 70. Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, supra note 62, art. 
13. 
 71. Jingyun Li & Jingjing Liu, Quest for Clean Water: China’s Newly 
Amended Water Pollution Control Law, WILSON CTR. (July 7, 2009), 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/quest-for-clean-water-chinas-newly-
amended-water-pollution-control-law#sthash.vaquLxby.dpuf. 
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Other relevant legal instruments are the Mineral Resources 
Law72 and the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
Sino-foreign Cooperation in the Exploitation of Continental Pe-
troleum Resources.73 The former outlines a unified regional 
registration regime for the exploration of mineral resources, 
and is thus applicable to shale gas exploitation.74 To obtain 
permission for exploration and extraction of minerals, a pro-
duction plan must be submitted for approval by the Depart-
ment of Geology and Mineral Resources. However, the qualify-
ing criteria for approval are quite vague, and the law does not 
specifically define them.75 On the other hand, the Regulations 
of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-foreign Cooperation 
in the Exploitation of Continental Petroleum Resources targets 
the types of partnerships currently spreading in the explora-
tion and production of unconventional gas.76 The problem ap-
                                                                                                                            
 72. P.R.C. Law on Mineral Resources (promulgated by Order No. 36 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 19, 1986, effective Aug. 29, 
1996). 
 73. Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Exploitation of 
On-shore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises 
(promulgated by Decree No. 317 of the State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China, Sept. 23, 2001, effective Sept. 23, 2001). 
 74. P.R.C. Law on Mineral Resources, supra note 72, art. 16. 
 75. The qualifying criteria for approval require adherence to: “qualifica-
tions prescribed by the State, and the department in charge of examination 
and approval shall, in accordance with law and relevant State regulations 
examine the enterprise’s mining area, its mining design or mining plan, pro-
duction and technological conditions and safety and environmental protection 
measures.” Id. art. 15. 
 76. In particular, Article 13 states: 
To cooperate in the exploitation of on-shore resources, the Chinese 
petroleum companies and the foreign enterprise must enter into a 
contract. Unless laws, regulations or the contract specifies otherwise, 
the foreign enterprise entering into the contract (hereinafter referred 
to as the “foreign contractor”) solely shall provide the investment for 
the exploration, be responsible for the exploration operations and 
bear all exploration risks. After the discovery of an oil (gas) field 
with commercial exploitation value, the foreign contractor and the 
Chinese petroleum companies shall jointly invest in cooperative de-
velopment. The foreign contractor shall undertake the development 
and production operations, until production operations are taken 
over by Chinese petroleum companies as stipulated in the contract. 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Exploitation of On-shore 
Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises, art. 13. Lian-
yong Feng et al., Developmental Features of the Chinese Petroleum Industry 
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pears to be that there are potentially applicable domestic and 
regional laws but inadequate mechanisms for their implemen-
tation. 
As for environmental law, despite the efforts made by China 
to craft a comprehensive environmental legal framework over 
the past thirty years, in practice, implementation has been no-
toriously poor.77 Nevertheless, during China’s 11th Five-Year 
Plan period (2006–10), bureaucrats started taking innovative 
action on environmental protection and energy efficiency, set-
ting high priority, quantitative pollution reduction and energy 
efficiency performance targets that were assigned to governors, 
mayors, county magistrates, and State-owned enterprise lead-
ers in every corner of China’s massive bureaucracy. This new 
perspective derived from the prioritization of environmental 
protection through the “cadre evaluation system,” i.e., China’s 
system for top-down bureaucratic personnel evaluation.78 As 
Alex L. Wang remarked, this evaluation framework is part of a 
far-reaching political strategy to limit risks to the party-state’s 
hold on power.79 In this vein, the cadre evaluation system fos-
tered the use of environmental protection as an instrument for 
promoting the essential elements of China’s “performance legit-
imacy,” namely, sustained economic growth and social stabil-
ity.80 This shows how decentered the role of law in Chinese 
governance still is, and stresses the primary role of hierarchical 
structures and bureaucratic-plan targets.81 Consequentially, 
                                                                                                                            
in Recent Years, in THE CHINESE OIL INDUSTRY: HISTORY AND FUTURE 17, 36–
37 (Springer, 2013). 
 77. A leading Chinese environmental law scholar stated: “China’s green 
laws are useless.” Jin Wang, China’s Green Laws are Useless, CHINA 
DIALOGUE (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3831. 
 78. Wang, supra note 69, at 368, n. 13 (“‘Cadres,’ simply put, are party-
state bureaucrats, which in the Chinese system include bureaucrats in State 
agencies and bureaus, state-owned enterprise workers, and staff in a range of 
other state institutions.”). 
 79. Id. at 370. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Wang remarks, 
Bureaucratic mandates sit at the core of China’s governance appa-
ratus, leading the way. Despite years of official rhetoric on the de-
velopment of Chinese rule of law, laws and regulations remain sec-
ondary. And their implementation is heavily influenced by whether 
they support or conflict with senior bureaucratic mandates. As a 
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Chinese leaders have relied mainly on top-down party-state 
bureaucratic mandates to drive performance of new environ-
mental goals. At the same time, the cadre evaluation system 
represents an effort to promote (although haltingly) environ-
mental values as a new source of legitimacy in line with the 
Hu-Wen rubric of a “harmonious society” as a programmatic 
response to concerns about declining State legitimacy.82 
                                                                                                                            
practical matter, to understand Chinese governance we must under-
stand this relationship between targets and law. 
Id. at 372; see also Carl Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 935, 949 (2011). 
 82. In the early 2000s, China’s leadership spurred an internal debate on 
how to strengthen the legitimacy of China’s regime. The debate mirrored con-
cerns about the limits of regime legitimacy mainly relying on economic per-
formance, and highlighted the need for “an ongoing shift from growth-
centered performance to a post-growth mode of legitimation that incorporated 
social equality, justice, and welfare.” Bruce Gilley & Heike Holbig, The De-
bate on Party Legitimacy in China: a Mixed Quantitative/Qualitative Analy-
sis, 18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 339, 339, 357 (2009). On February, 19, 2005, Chi-
nese President Hu Jintao stressed the importance of developing the capacity 
to create a “harmonious society,” i.e. a society based on democracy and rule of 
law, fairness and justice, honesty and friendliness, full of vigor, and a harmo-
nious relationship between humans and nature. See Hu Jintao, Building a 
Harmonious Society Important Task for CPC, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Feb. 
21, 2005), http://en.people.cn/200502/20/eng20050220_174036.html; Paolo D. 
Farah, EU and US Perspectives about China’s Compliance with Transparency 
Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism, 33 LEGAL ISSUES 
ECON. INTEGRATION, 263, 275 (2006). On the broader implications on global 
justice of environmental issues, see generally BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL, 
MICHAEL H. DWORKIN, GLOBAL ENERGY JUSTICE (2014). Furthermore, the re-
port to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China stresses 
the importance of ecological civilization as a key element for the well-being of 
the Chinese people and the future of the country. The report also develops the 
concept of “Beautiful China,” introducing a notion of development that em-
phasizes the strategic relevance of environmental protection even when this 
could be in conflict with energy security and economic development. Bruce 
Gilley and Heike Holbig argue that the Hu-Wen harmonious society repre-
sented a “programmatic solution to China’s ‘performance dilemma’ and an 
innovative model of political legitimation.” Id. On this point, see Resolution 
on Strengthening the Construction of the Party’s Governing Capacity, ap-
proved by the 4th plenary session of the 16th CCP Central Committee (Sep-
tember 16–19, 2004), available in Chinese at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2809350.html. The performance 
dilemma is the risk that autocratic rulers face undermining their own power 
if reforms that generate good economic performance lead to demands for 
greater political participation and democracy. 
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On more general terms, it can be said that there are two gen-
erations of Chinese “environmental” laws: the first focused on 
economic development, and the second on environmental pro-
tection. This parallels the general shift in U.S. legislation from 
pre-1960s laws to the new laws enacted from the 1960s through 
the 1980s.83 The traditional Chinese environmental laws84 fo-
cused on the development and use of natural resources by hu-
mans rather than the relationship between humans and na-
ture,85 whose ethical basis is to be found in the deep-rooted 
                                                                                                                            
 83. Christopher L. Bell et al., Government Institutes, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW HANDBOOK (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 21st ed. 2011); Brittany Dunton, 
Recent Developments in Environmental Law, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 166, 
175 (2012); Lisa Heinzerling, New Directions in Environmental Law: A Cli-
mate of Possibility, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 266–68 (2011); Linda K. 
Breggin et al., Trends in Environmental Law Scholarship 2008-2012, 43 
ENVTL. L. REV. 10643 (2012); Amy J. Wildermuth, Next Step: The Integration 
of Energy Law and Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 380 
(2011); Donald N. Zillman, Evolution of Modern Energy Law: a Personal Ret-
rospective, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 485, 489–94 (2012); J. B. Ruhl, 
Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environ-
mental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 343 (2010); VED P. NANDA & GEORGE ROCK 
PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2d revised ed. 2012); R. Daniel Kelemen & David Vogel, Trading 
Places: The Role of the United States and the European Union in Internation-
al Environmental Politics, 43 COMP. POL. STUD. 427 (2010). 
 84. These laws include the Prevention and Control Atmospheric Pollution 
Act, the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution Act, the Prevention and 
Control of Solid Wastes Act, the Prevention and Control of Prevention from 
Environmental Noise Act, and the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pol-
lution Act. P.R.C. Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollu-
tion (promulgated by the President of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 29, 
2000, effective Sept. 1, 2000) art. 1.; see P.R.C. Law on the Prevention and 
Control of Water Pollution, supra note 62; P.R.C. Law on the Prevention and 
Control of Envtl. Pollution by Solid Wastes (promulgated by Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005) art. 1.; P.R.C. Law 
on the Prevention and Control of Pollution From Envtl. Noise (promulgated 
by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 29, 1996, effective Mar. 1, 
1997) art. 1.; P.R.C. Law on Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution 
(promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jun. 28, 2003, effec-
tive Oct. 1, 2003) art. 1. See also Mingde Cao, Fundamental Principles of Eco-
logical Law, 39 2002 U. WUHAN INT’L L. REV. 39 (2002). 
 85. Mingde points out that China’s environmental and energy law and 
policy before 2000 was built upon the ethical basis of a narrow anthropocen-
trism, whose concept for legislation and tenet embodied the natural concept 
of utilitarianism. Mingde Cao, The Current and Future Trends in Chinese 
Environmental and Energy Law and Policy, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 253, 258 
(2006). 
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concept of “harmonious nature.”86 These laws do not emphasize 
the prevention of environmental pollution but instead focus on 
remediation and passive reactions, and eventually risk dis-
harmony and friction in the relationship between humans and 
nature. Conversely, the newest generation of Chinese environ-
mental laws emphasizes the purpose of achieving harmony 
with nature and its conservation, rather than stressing eco-
nomic growth. That said, recent Chinese environmental laws 
are substantially different from earlier legal instruments, as 
they foster the recycling economy and regulate clean processes 
of production,87 focusing on minimizing pollution from the be-
ginning through the end of the production process. 
In the context of shale gas environmental hazards, two legal 
instruments come into play: the 2003 Law of the People’s Re-
public of China on the Promotion of Clean Production,88 and 
the 2002 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Environ-
                                                                                                                            
 86. Mingde Cao remarks that the concept of “harmonious nature” has a 
deep cultural root in China’s traditional culture, and should be inherited and 
applied to today’s environmental challenges. In that respect, Confucianism 
developed the principles that “nature and human beings understand each 
other,” and of “nature and human beings combined into one.” Regarding the 
relationship between humans and nature, Taoism preached noninterference 
and adaptation with the course of natural events. In the same vein, Bud-
dhism advocated the right of natural life forms other than humans to exist. 
Mingde Cao & Yi-xiang Xu, The Formulation of Chinese Civil Code and the 
Protection of Ecology, 4 XIAN DAI FAXUE [Mod. L. Sci.] 13 (2003); see also Pao-
lo D. Farah, L’influenza della concezione confuciana sulla costruzione del 
sistema giuridico e politico cinese [The Influence of Confucianism in the Con-
struction of the Chinese Juridical and Political System], in IDENTITÀ EUROPEA 
E POLITICHE MIGRATORIE 193–226 (Giovanni Bombelli & Bruno Montanari 
eds., 2008); Jean-Yves Heurtebise, Understanding Non-Trade Concerns 
Through Comparative Chinese and European Philosophy of Law, in CHINA’S 
INFLUENCE ON NON-TRADE CONCERNS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Paolo 
Davide Farah ed., forthcoming 2016). 
 87. “Clean production” is understood as a new industrial mode featuring 
technical plausibility, economic rationality and eco-efficiency, which is at the 
core of realizing a hazardless industry, i.e., production is organized in accord-
ance with ecological principles, and raw materials are recycled in a closed 
cycle. 
 88. Law on the Promotion of Clean Production (promulgated by the Stand-
ing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. June 29, 2002, effective January 1, 2003), 
2003 - Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 72, as 
revised pursuant to the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress on Revising the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Promotion of Cleaner Production” promulgated on February 29, 2012 - Order 
of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 54. 
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ment Impact Assessment.89 The former specifically addresses 
pollution from oil and gas production, requiring that operators 
and subcontractors involved in petroleum production “protect 
fishery resources and other natural resources and prevent the 
environment, including the air, sea, rivers, lakes and land, 
from being polluted or damaged” through respect of interna-
tional standards and best practices.90 On the other hand, the 
2002 Law on Environment Impact Assessment fosters a predic-
tive evaluation policy on the environmental impact that may 
occur due to the implementation of building projects and plan-
ning. This regime is thus consistent with the purposes of sus-
tainable development91 and the principle of environmental law 
of “pollution prevention first.”92 
                                                                                                                            
 89. Jesse L. Moorman & Zhang Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public 
Participation in China’s Environmental Impact Assessment Process: Compar-
ing China’s EIA Law and U.S. NEPA, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 281, 282 (2007). 
Adopted in October 2002, the EIA became effective on September 1, 2003. 
 90. An indicative case study on enforcement is the benzene chemical spill 
of 2005 in the Junhgua River. Weili Duan et al., The Situation of Hazardous 
Chemical Accidents in China Between 2000 and 2006, 186 J. HAZARDOUS 
MATERIALS 1489 (2011). Jane Qiu, China to Spend Billions Cleaning up 
Groundwater SCIENCE 745, 745 (2011). Xiao Yong Wang et al., Water Pollu-
tion Emergencies in China: Actualities, Prevention and Response, 159 
ADVANCED MATERIALS RES. 589 (2011). 
 91. This concept of “sustainable development” stems from the concept that 
individuals should respect and care for the community of life, recognize that 
all beings are interdependent, and that every form of life has value regardless 
of its worth to human beings. See Nicholas A. Robinson, Enforcing Environ-
mental Norms: Diplomatic and Judicial Approaches, 26 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 387, 387–89 (2003). As Chapin Folke, and Kofinas remarked, 
“social–ecological sustainability requires that society’s economy and other 
human activities not exceed the capacity of ecosystems to provide services, 
which, in turn, is constrained by the planet’s life-support system.” F. Stuart 
Chapin, III, et al., A Framework for Understanding Change, in PRINCIPLES OF 
ECOSYSTEM STEWARDSHIP: RESILIENCE-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 6 (F. Stuart Chapin, III, et al. eds, 2009). 
See also Doug M. Brown, Market and Exchange in Premodern Economies, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 84–88 (Philip A. O’Hara ed., 2001). 
 92. On this principle, see James E. Hickey Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining 
the Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 423 (1994); Nicolas De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: from 
Political Slogans to Legal Rules (2002); David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can They Be Reconciled, 2013 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 771 (2013). 
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B. Potential Regulations, Policies, and Protections for Hydrau-
lic Fracturing 
As a result, it would be advisable for jurisdictions in which 
hydraulic fracturing techniques are employed to first have gas 
companies conduct a thorough environmental impact assess-
ment.93 The shale gas drilling process can lead to land subsid-
ence and earth vibrations, carrying with it civil liability for the 
oil operators who need to implement protective measures with 
a view to damage prevention.94 If damage to protected inter-
ests—such as property, life, or the environment—occurs, com-
pensation takes the form of restoration of the conditions as 
they existed before the damage occurred. In this regard, the 
liability regime established by the Chinese Civil Code, mining, 
and environmental legislation is applicable to any damage re-
sulting from shale gas exploration and production activities. 
Moreover, Chinese lawmakers should also adopt and effectively 
enact legislation requiring water sampling near proposed well 
sites and a minimum liability insurance coverage for bodily in-
jury and property damage caused by well operations.95 Regard-
ing the crucial value of assessment, Hannah Wiseman main-
tains that the assessment process is necessarily multifactorial 
and contingent, consequentially determining whether optimal 
regulation occurs at the state, regional, or national level is con-
tingent on being able to assess accurately the risks associated 
with resource development.96 
China undoubtedly has a number of laws that are able to 
guarantee the protection of its water supplies in the fracking 
process. Nonetheless, due to the general nontechnical content 
of environmental laws and the lack of risk assessment, they 
could be described as merely vague policy commitments rather 
than substantive, enforceable legal instruments. Several Chi-
nese extraction laws could be relevant regarding shale gas pro-
duction. However, they shape an inconsistent and fragmented 
                                                                                                                            
 93. The EIA should be topped by a seismological impact assessment on the 
geological impact of shale gas operations on the stability of earth at or near 
the well sites. 
 94. Environmental and Social Risk Briefing Oil & Gas, BARCLAYS (Mar. 
2015), 
https://www.home.barclays/content/dam/barclayspublic/docs/Citizenship/oil-
and-gas-guidance-note.pdf. 
 95. See the recently adopted legislation in Ohio on this point, S.B. 315. 
 96. Wiseman, supra note 7. 
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combination of regulations addressing other nontraditional ex-
tractive industries and government directives on extraction.97 
For instance, the Chinese policy on unconventional gas devel-
opment and production partially reflects regulatory solutions 
adopted for methane extraction from coal seams (Coalbed Me-
thane or CBM).98 This would entail a series of import duty re-
ductions or exemptions for technological imports that are used 
for shale gas exploration, exemptions from the payment of ex-
ploration and extraction rights, and also production subsidies.99 
The government is actually already referring to the policy de-
veloped for the CBM as a starting point to draft a policy related 
to shale gas,100 especially regarding the environmental ap-
                                                                                                                            
 97. In particular, regulations crafted by the MEP deal with issues related 
to emissions standards, surface draining systems, and restriction on gas 
emission in the environment. Moreover, regulations developed by the MLR 
outline the national policy on fees and royalties from mining prospects and 
other fiscal-related concerns, while standard price-sharing contracts require 
international energy enterprises to share large portions of their output with 
the government besides paying corporate taxes on profits. Finally, land rights 
and control of shale acreage are also governed by regulations issued by the 
MLR and not directly by national oil companies. 
 98. CBM is a methane gas that is extracted from the coal seams existing in 
some geological fields’ subsoil. Dameng Yu et al., A Review on Studies of 
Coalbed Methane Reservoirs in China, 1 GEOLOGICAL SCI. & TECHN. INFO. 13 
(2001); Qin Yong, Advances and Reviews on Research of Coalbed Gas Geology 
in China, 3 GEOLOGICAL J. CHINA U. 2 (2003). 
 99. In this context, one must also evaluate whether the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
rules, especially Articles III and I that define the Agreement’s sphere of ap-
plication and subject, find a match in the energy sector. For an in-depth 
analysis of subsidies regulation within WTO legislation, see, in addition to 
the cited volumes and note 20, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 687–734 (Patrick F. J. Macrory et al. 
eds., 2005); JEFF WAINCYMER, WTO LITIGATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF 
FORMAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 765–69 (2002); R. K. GUPTA, ANTI-DUMPING AND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE (1996); MICHAEL J. 
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
268-73 (3rd ed. 2005); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 186, 2003). See also VALERIE DI COMITE, LE SOVVENZIONI E LE 
MISURE COMPENSATIVE NELL’ORGANIZZAZIONE MONDIALE DEL COMMERCIO 
(2009); M. Orlandi, La disciplina delle sovvenzioni concesse dagli Stati nella 
normativa OMC, in QUADERNI DI STUDI EUROPEI. I SUSSIDI E GLI AIUTI DI STATO 
(2002). 
 100. Don Kun Luo et al., Economic Evaluation Based Policy Analysis for 
Coalbed Methane Industry in China, 36 ENERGY 360 (2011). 
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proach developed in the CBM area.101 With regard to interna-
tional cooperation policies, CBM exploration from foreign com-
panies must occur pursuant to domestic laws regulating on-
shore oil resources in order to ensure a minimum standard of 
environmental protection, which should be enhanced in the 
shale gas field as well.102 
The CBM legislation can also set an example with regard to 
the fiscal policy applied for energy companies involved in the 
unconventional gas production cycle. For example, every ener-
gy company operating in the CBM industry obtains a full re-
fund of value-added tax.103 Similarly, the equipment and in-
strumentation required for exploration and developing opera-
tions are free of duties, import taxes, and value-added tax.104 
Less onerous business income taxation is desirable as well. 
With regard to this, the Chinese government set the business 
income tax for independent national companies operating in 
the CBM industry at the favorable rate of 25 percent starting 
from 2008.105 Likewise, domestic energy companies cooperating 
with foreign companies in the CBM industry benefit from a 
preferential fiscal policy, under which they are exempted from 
paying income tax for two years starting from the first income-
accruing year. This mechanism might allow energy companies 
                                                                                                                            
 101. Specifically, in July 2008, the MEP issued the Emission Standard of 
CBM/CMM regarding new mines and surface drainage systems. 
 102. Technology development in the shale gas exploration and exploitation 
field should be encouraged by the Chinese government as it already did in the 
1983 National Programme on Research of Essential Technologies, through 
which the government incentivized the development of technologies related to 
CBM exploration and development. Baizhan Li & Runming Yao, Urbanisa-
tion and its Impact on Building Energy Consumption and Efficiency in China, 
34 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1994 (2009). The development of innovative technolo-
gies in natural gas and oil exploration has been fostered also by the Mid-term 
and Long-term Scientific and Technological Programme (2006-2020). Fourth 
Globelics Conference in Mexico City, Report by Shulin Gu et al. on China’s 
System and Vision of Innovation: Analysis of the National Medium- and 
Long-term Science and Technology Development Plan for 2006–2020 (Sept. 
22–24, 2008). 
 103. JANE NAKANO, DAVID PUMPHREY, ROBERT PRICE, JR. & MOLLY A. 
WATSON, PROSPECTS FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA EXAMINING 
POTENTIALS AND CHALLENGES IN CHINA AND INDIA 7 (2012), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/120911_Nakano_ProspectsShaleGas_Web.pdf. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
2016] Comparative Perspectives on Shale Gas in China 611 
to face the high unconventional gas production initial costs, 
therefore fostering investments and technological progress. 
Given that the costs related to producing shale gas in China 
are higher than conventional gas, a subsidy policy is advisable in 
order to allow companies to join the sector. This technique has 
already been implemented by the MOF regarding energy com-
panies involved in the CBM sector in China, which are entitled 
to a financial allowance of 0.02 renminbi per cubic meter when 
the gas is exploited locally, sold for domestic use, or used as a 
raw material for chemical processes.106 To that end, the Chi-
nese government has introduced subsidies for shale gas indus-
try development, offering mining enterprises operating in the 
sector an allowance of 0.4 renminbi per cubic meter from 2012–
2015, which is twice the amount provided for the CBM sector, 
though it has been observed that the allowance’s short duration 
is not enough to draw foreign investment.107 Also, pursuant to 
the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (effec-
tive since January 30, 2012), foreign investments in the shale 
gas sector are subsumed under the “promotional” investment 
category, which allows foreign investors to form joint ven-
tures—including contractual ones—with their Chinese part-
ners.108 Furthermore, equipment and technologies imported for 
                                                                                                                            
 106. Sino Gas & Energy, Developing Chinese Unconventional Gas Assets, 
Presentation to dbAccess China Conference 2014, at 17, 
http://sinogasenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014-
01_China_unconventional_gas.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 107. Id. 
 108. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, SHALE GAS HANDBOOK 53 (2013), 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/norton-rose-fulbright-shale-gas-
handbook-108992.pdf. See Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment In-
dustries, section 
II. Mining and Quarrying Industries: . . . (6) Prospecting and exploi-
tation of such conventional oil resources as oil shale, oil sand, heavy 
oil and super heavy oil (limited to equity joint venture and contrac-
tual joint venture) . . . (9) Prospecting and exploitation of unconven-
tional natural gas resources such as shale gas and submarine natu-
ral gas hydrate (limited to equity joint venture and contractual joint 
venture). 
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (Amended in 
2011), MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Feb. 21, 2012, 
2:51 PM), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/aaa/201203/2012030802783
7.shtml. 
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exploration and development of the shale gas industry that are 
earmarked for that specific use and are not producible in China 
are free of duties and customs tariffs.109 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS: FOCUS ON WATER 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
There are existing critical concerns about fresh water man-
agement in relation to unconventional gas.110 These two natu-
ral resources have come to be complexly associated because the 
extraction, treatment, and distribution of fresh water entail 
considerable energy, while the production of fossil fuel energy 
involves fresh water.111 Water concerns associated with uncon-
ventional fossil fuel extraction and production are augmented 
by growing demand from an increasing population and the in-
fluence of climate change on the hydrologic cycle.112 Shale gas 
is a relatively clean and efficient burning fuel with the poten-
tial to lower carbon emissions. Nevertheless, risks remain, and 
the role of shale gas in the world’s overall energy mix has been 
met with fierce opposition due to environmental concerns over 
hydraulic fracturing technology and its potential to cause envi-
ronmental harm,113 due to its shallower deposits, greater per-
meability, and more superficial formations. 
                                                                                                                            
 109. Desheng Hu & Shengqing Xu, Opportunity, Challenges and Policy 
Choices for China on the Development of Shale Gas, 60 ENERGY POL’Y 21, 21–
26 (2013). See also the new Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Cata-
logue draft, the consultations of which closed on December 3, 2014. 
 110. A wider debate exists on the carbon footprint of unconventional gas. 
See Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon 
Affected and Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RES. J. 3, 7 (2010). 
 111. As remarked by scholar Paula J. Schauwecker, “Water consumption 
and oil consumption are on a precariously parallel course.” Paula J. Schau-
wecker, Oil and Water: Fueling Questions, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 46, 47 
(2009). 
 112. Robert E. Beck, Current Water Issues in Oil and Gas Development and 
Production: Will Water Control What Energy We Have?, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 
423, 424 (2010) (remarking that there are no fresh water alternatives, and 
water cannot be replaced). Consequentially, given the overlap between ener-
gy and water, both lawmakers and scientists must account for these inter-
connections, as they model and manage the hydrologic cycle. 
 113. The focus of this study on environmental aspects related to shale gas 
exploration and extraction should not render one oblivious of the other issues 
that may impact the development of global unconventional gas resources: 
fiscal conditions, landowner acceptance, interference from local authorities, 
pipeline and infrastructure issues, availability of technology, equipment and 
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Fracking involves drilling a well bore into a reservoir rock 
formation and then forcing water, sand, and chemicals into the 
well at high pressures to create fractures or fissures in the 
rock. Once the fracture is open, the released gas flows out of 
the fractures and into the well bore. In addition to shale gas, 
the process has recently been applied to extract gas from coal 
seams and tight sand deposits.114 
These considerations mean that the extent to which shale gas 
becomes a larger element of the energy mix will depend on bal-
ancing environmental protection against economic growth. 
Some U.S. states and some EU countries, such as France, have 
already banned or imposed moratoria115 on hydraulic fracturing 
due to environmental concerns116 in attempts to harmonize en-
vironmental risks with energy security benefits. Conversely, 
China may opt for accepting greater environmental risks in or-
der to bolster shale gas production and thus satisfy growing 
domestic energy demands, as well as create new jobs that full-
scale production would generate, particularly for low-skilled 
workers.117 However, bearing in mind the relevant geological 
factors, infrastructure challenges, and environmental hazards, 
it is one thing to find shale gas, and another to obtain commer-
cially viable production from it. 
                                                                                                                            
skilled labor force, and gas players’ experience. See, e.g., Susan L. Sakmar, 
The Global Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States Be the Role Model for 
the Development of Shale Gas Around the World?, 33 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 369 
(2011). 
 114. NAHED TAHER, BANDAR AL-HAJJA, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT IN SAUDI 
ARABIA: CONCERNS & OPPORTUNITIES 139 (2013). 
 115. Moratoria represents a precautionary measure par excellence. ARIE 
TROUWBORST, PRECAUTIONARY RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES 129 (2006). See 
also Jeffrey C. King, Selected Re-Emerging and Emerging Trends in Oil and 
Gas Law as Result of Production from Shale Formations, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN 
L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011); Thomas Swartz, Hydraulic Fracturing: Risks and Risk 
Management, 26 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 30, 30 (2011). 
 116. The French Senate approved a ban on fracking in June 2011, as a re-
sult of extensive public protest. However, fracking is still permitted for scien-
tific testing. See Ruven Fleming, Shale Gas––A Comparison of European 
Moratoria, 1 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 12 (2013). 
 117. In the United States, the shale gas industry has created six hundred 
thousand new jobs. Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, U.S. Dep’t of Ener-
gy, Shale Gas Production Subcommittee 90-Day Report 1, 5 (Aug. 18, 2011), 
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/081811_90_day_report_final.pdf. 
See generally Thomas C. Kinnaman, The Economic Impact of Shale Gas Ex-
traction: A Review of Existing Studies, 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1243 (2011). 
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As the creation of fracking fluid entails mixing of millions of 
gallons of fresh water with thousands of gallons of chemicals,118 
it is crucial to assess how harmful the fracking process might 
be to the environment.119 First, hydraulic fracturing is suppos-
edly responsible for a number of incidences of seismic activity, 
such as minor earthquakes and tremors. These seismic activi-
ties seem to be caused by either the fracking process itself or 
the injection of fracking wastewater into wells.120 So far, there 
has been a more than a four-fold increase in earthquakes of 
magnitude three and greater in the central United States since 
2008, that are “almost certainly” caused by fracking activi-
ties.121 Similarly, in April and May 2011, shale gas exploratory 
drilling has been suspended in Lancashire, United Kingdom, 
following two earthquakes with magnitudes of 1.5 and 2.3.122 A 
consequent report commissioned by the Cuadrilla Resources 
Ltd.,123 the British company exploring for natural shale gas in 
                                                                                                                            
 118. See Wes Deweese, Fracturing Misconceptions: A History of Effective 
State Regulation, Groundwater Protection, and the Ill-Conceived FRAC Act, 6 
Okla. J. L. & Tech., no. 49, 2010, at 2. The EPA reports that hazardous fluids 
employed in fracking are often injected into shale formations at high volumes 
(a maximum average of 150,000 gallons per well, and a minimum average of 
57,500 gallons per well). United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, Final Report on 
Evaluation of Impacts to Underground Sources of Drinking Water by Hydrau-
lic Fracturing of Coalbed Methane Reservoirs 3–11 (June 2004) [hereinafter 
EPA 2004], 
https://fracfocus.org/sites/default/files/publications/evaluation_of_impacts_to_
under-
ground_sources_of_drinking_water_by_hydraulic_fracturing_of_coalbed_met
hane_reservoirs.pdf. 
 119. On the risks related to shale gas development, see generally Mark Zo-
back et al., Addressing the Environmental Risks from Shale Gas Develop-
ment, (Worldwide Inst., Briefing Paper 1, 2010); Burleson, supra note 63, at 
329. On the potential health hazards, see Michelle Bamberger & Robert E. 
Oswald, Impacts of Gas Drilling on Human and Animal Health, 22 New Solu-
tions: J. Envtl. & Occupational Health Pol’y 51, 57–77 (2012). 
 120. Zoback, supra note 119, at 9. 
 121. Ajay Makan, Fracking Water Linked to Earthquakes, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 
14, 2012, 1:28 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e268a268-84f6-11e1-a3c5-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2gMxH4mz3. 
 122. C. A. Green, P. Styles & B.J. Baptie, Preese Hall Shale Gas Fracturing: 
Review and Recommendation for Induced Seismic Mitigation 1 (2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/15745/5075-preese-hall-shale-gas-fracturing-review.pdf. 
 123. Dep’t of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Fracking UK Shale: Un-
derstanding Earthquake Risk 5 (2014), 
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the Bowland Basin in Lancashire, indicated that “it is highly 
probable that the hydraulic fracturing of Cuadrilla’s Preese 
Hall-1 well did trigger a number of minor seismic events.”124 
This of course has relevant implications for local residential 
and infrastructure damage. Seismic activity could also impact 
a well’s integrity and cause further underground water con-
tamination, as it could create leakages and new fractures, be-
sides deforming well casings. Seismic activity can break or 
shear well casings as well, which is particularly dangerous in 
earthquake zones. This means that even if technical precau-
tions to block off sensitive upper-level groundwater zones are 
taken, damaged casing could result in leaks, especially in envi-
ronments physically under pressure. Moreover, Sichuan prov-
ince, where most of the Chinese shale gas is located, is a region 
extremely prone to earthquakes; for example, the 2008 Great 
Sichuan Earthquake resulted in 69,195 deaths and over 18,300 
missing.125 
In addition to the risks related to seismic activities, principal 
concerns include groundwater contamination with fracking 
chemicals,126 gasification,127 water usage risks, surface water 
                                                                                                                            
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/283837/Seismic_v3.pdf. 
 124. Press Release Geomechanical Study, CUADRILLA RESOURCES (Feb. 11, 
2011) http://www.cuadrillaresources.com/news/cuadrilla-news/article/press-
release-geomechanical-study/. 
 125. Xinglin Lei et al., A Detailed View of the Injection‐Induced Seismicity 
in a Natural Gas Reservoir in Zigong, Southwestern Sichuan Basin, Chi-
na,  118 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES.: SOLID EARTH 4296 (2013); Michael Esposito, 
Water Issues Set the Pace for Fracking Regulations and Global Shale Gas 
Extraction, 22 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 167 (2013); Nicola Jones, Wastewater 
Injection Cracks Open Quake Concerns, 6 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 329, 329 
(2013); William L. Ellsworth, Injection-Induced Earthquakes, SCIENCE, July 
12, 2013; Bob Weinhold, Energy Development Linked with Earthquakes, 120 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. a388 (2012); Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About 
Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971 (2013). 
 126. Currently, China does not have a regulatory framework aimed at en-
suring that wastewater injection into underground wells does not endanger 
groundwater. Such regulations would ensure that wastewater injection into 
underground wells, including injection of hazardous wastewater produced 
from hydraulic fracturing, would not endanger local water supplies. Lan Nan, 
Legal Tools for Groundwater Protection: Insights from International Experi-
ence, 8 CHINA J. NAT. RESOURCES ECON. 33–43 (2011). 
 127. When gas migrates into groundwater, the build-up of pressure due to 
gasification may lead to tremors or explosions. Aquifer gasification due to 
shale gas development has been cited as a potential cause for recent minor 
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and soil risks spills, and blow-outs. Conversely, environmental-
ists argue that, although hydraulic fracturing is believed to be 
less water intensive than nuclear energy and coal production, it 
is unlikely that it will replace either energy source.128 Rather, 
shale gas development carries the danger of creating an addi-
tional demand for water. Shortage of water is one of the most 
crucial issues facing shale gas development in China, as water 
is a fundamental element in the fracking process. In the shale 
gas-rich Sichuan Basin, this is a primary concern due to the 
province’s agricultural legacy that furnishes the country with 
roughly 7 percent of its rice, wheat, and other grains.129 There 
are three possible outcomes for the water used during fracking: 
(1) it can be extracted, recycled, and used again; (2) it can be 
left inside of the shale deposit; or (3) it can be extracted and 
stored on or off site or treated for other uses.130 
The use of recycled water for hydraulic operations is highly 
advisable, given the intense residential and industrial demand 
for water in Sichuan and water scarcity concerns in Xinjiang.131 
Regulations should also consider the possibility of establishing 
a closed-loop system of energy production, using mine-drainage 
                                                                                                                            
seismic activity in the United Kingdom, though these claims are largely un-
proven at this point and are being investigated. See KPMG GLOB. ENERGY 
INST., supra note 51. 
 128. Bridget R. Scanlon et al., Drought and the Water–Energy Nexus in 
Texas, 8 ENVTL. RES. LETT. 1 (2013), 
http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/8/4/045033/pdf; Jean-
Phillipe Nicot & Bridget R. Scanlon, Water Use for Shale-Gas Production in 
Texas, 46 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 3580 (2012); Ian J. Laurenzi & Gilbert R. Jersey, 
Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Freshwater Consumption of Mar-
cellus Shale Gas, 47 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 4896 (2013). 
 129. Joel Kirkland, China Begins to Tap Its Shale Gas, Despite Daunting 
Technological, Environmental Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/10/14/14climatewire-china-begins-to-tap-
its-shale-gas-despite-da-95706.html?pagewanted=all 
 130. Deweese, supra note 118, at 19. Schauwecker, supra note 111, at 47. 
Gas drillers are experimenting with new technologies and methods empower-
ing them to be more effective at recycling fracking water. See the use of “mo-
bile heated distillation units” by Devon Energy Corporation as an example of 
emerging efficiencies. See Laura C. Reeder, Creating a Legal Framework for 
Regulation of Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale Formation, 
34 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 999, 1013 (2010). 
 131. Zmarak Shalizi, Addressing China’s Growing Water Shortages and 
Associated Social and Environmental Consequences 6 (World Bank, Policy 
Res. Working Paper No. 3895, 2006), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=923238. 
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water from coal production (after having neutralized and re-
moved heavy metals), thus integrating industrial ecology prac-
tices into the fracking process. However, this practice should 
only be implemented after groundwater regulations are 
strengthened, and after China has gained substantial experi-
ence in minimizing pollution from fracturing operations, while 
also ensuring the proper disposal of the heavy-metal waste 
products from treating these industrial water sources.132 
Water is an especially urgent issue for China as its per capita 
availability of drinking water is very low, and water resources 
are not well distributed throughout the country.133 Diverging 
water supplies from agriculture to shale gas production could 
be catastrophic, in particular if the contaminated water also 
pollutes farmlands. Conversely, for other shale gas basins in 
Tarim, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, the scarcity of water is 
aggravated by the arid and hot climate. Shale gas exploration 
and production would thus require water to be carried from 
other parts of the country, which would raise costs unsustaina-
bly and impact the environment. Furthermore, climate change 
and China’s rapid economic development have led to an in-
crease in industrial and agricultural water consumption, while 
areas of desertification are expanding, deteriorating the ecolog-
ical environment which is already overexploited.134 In China, 
water availability for hydraulic fracturing may significantly 
reduce the prospective for national shale development in cer-
tain areas. Figure 1 draws attention to these potential water 
                                                                                                                            
 132. For example, in November 2011, the Pennsylvania Department of En-
vironmental Protection released a statement encouraging the oil and gas in-
dustry to utilize recycled mine drainage water in hydraulic fracturing. Penn-
sylvania Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., DEP Effort Encourages Oil and Gas Industry to 
Use Mine Drainage Water (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id
=19161&typeid=1. 
 133. Roberto Soprano, China and the Recognition and Protection of the Hu-
man Right to Water, in CHINA’S INFLUENCE ON NON-TRADE CONCERNS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Paolo Davide Farah & Elena Cima ed., forth-
coming 2016). 
 134. On desertification and water management in China, see CI LONGJUN & 
XAIOHUI WANG, DESERTIFICATION AND ITS CONTROL IN CHINA (2010). There is 
clearly tension between economic self-sufficiency in agriculture and in ener-
gy. Mark Harvey, & Sarah Pilgrim, The New Competition for Land: Food, 
Energy, and Climate Change, 36 FOOD POL’Y 1 (2011); Jörg Friedrichs, Global 
Energy Crunch: How Different Parts of the World Would React to a Peak Oil 
Scenario, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 4562, 4562–69 (2010). 
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scarcity issues in China, which are likely to make the costs of 
shale development exorbitant. 
 
Figure 2. China Shale Resource and Water Stress Map. Map 
replicated from “Natural Gas Weekly Kaleidoscope,” Barclay’s 
Capital Commodities Research (November 16, 2010). 
A. Implementation and Enforcement of Energy and Environ-
mental Laws: Fragmentation of Competences 
China’s poor law enforcement has undermined the efficacy of 
past efforts. In particular, China features a highly fragmented 
water-resources management system. Horizontally, several in-
stitutions are involved at every level of government. At the cen-
tral level, the National People’s Congress and State Council 
enact laws and administrative regulations and supervise their 
local implementation and enforcement. Additionally, several 
ministries and authorities are responsible in different ways in 
water management.135 
                                                                                                                            
 135. The Ministry of Water Resources, which is a leading agency for inte-
grated water resource management, water resource protection planning, wa-
ter function zoning, monitoring water quantity, and quality in rivers and 
lakes, issues water resource extraction permits and proposes water pricing  
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Figure 3. Water management competences allocation in China 
(Xie, Jian; Liebenthal, Andres; Warford, Jeremy J., Addressing 
China’s Water Scarcity: A Synthesis of Recommendations for 
Selected Water Resource Management Issues, 2008, World Bank 
Publications). 
 
This unwieldy regime carries the risks of creating both over-
laps and friction in responsibility, as the lines of demarcation 
between institutional jurisdictions and competences are not 
                                                                                                                            
policy; the MEP, specifically competent for water pollution laws, regulations 
and standards supervision and enforcement, and monitoring of water quality; 
the Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Construction; the Ministry of 
Agriculture; the Ministry of Land and Resources; the State Forest Admin-
istration; the Ministry of Transportation; the State Oceanic Administration; 
the NDRC; and the MOF. A common expression to describe the current sys-
tem is that “nine dragons” manage the water. See JIAN XIE ET AL., ADDRESSING 
CHINA’S WATER SCARCITY 30 (2009); Jiang Yong, China’s Water Scarcity, 90 J. 
ENVTL. MGMT. 3185, 3190–91 (2009). Wang Xinbo, Water Governance in Chi-
na: The Failure of a Top-Down Approach, in THE WATER REVOLUTION: 
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO WATER SCARCITY 149–71 (Barun Mitra et al. eds., 
2006); Yan Feng et al., Water Resources Administration Institution in China, 
8 WATER POL’Y 291 (2006). 
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always clear. Even the responsibility for water pollution pre-
vention and control, which should be a fundamental step in the 
shale gas extraction process, is distributed to different govern-
mental bodies. Vertically, the water-management regime fea-
tures similar fragmentation, and relies on unclear administra-
tive boundaries linked to different levels of government. Final-
ly, the political friction and informational asymmetry between 
central and local governments block more meaningful cohesive 
action. The absence of an overarching energy law causes over-
laps and contentious bureaucratic infighting that have a det-
rimental effect on the ability to face long-term energy challeng-
es. In fact, not just water management but energy governance 
as a whole has been decentralized during the course of several 
rounds of administrative reorganizations, dispersing and scat-
tering the country’s decentralized energy authority among par-
allel central ministries.136 
It remains to be seen what the implications will be for shale 
gas industry expansion in China, whether this fragmentation 
will further hamper its development or whether these chal-
lenges will be adequately met by a more integrated system, in-
spired, for instance, by the water-resource management sys-
tems of France and the United Kingdom.137 Given the fact that 
in China levels of pollution from industry and agriculture are 
dangerously high, shale gas should be developed and extracted 
relying on a regulatory and institutional framework capable of 
reducing any related environmental hazards, striking a bal-
ance between energy security benefits and environmental costs, 
in order to guarantee the right to water universally.138 The 
                                                                                                                            
 136. Bo Kong, Governing China’s Energy in the Context of Global Govern-
ance, 2 GLOBAL POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 51, 52–63 (2011). 
 137. Those water-resource management systems specifically aim at ensur-
ing the security of water supplies, protecting ecological resources of the water 
environment, and improving the efficiency of local water supply and 
wastewater treatment. Those regulatory objectives are achieved through dif-
ferent instruments, inter alia, consensual agreements among all stakeholders 
and technical advice. The financial resources originated from water pricing 
and the enforcement of the consumer-pays principle for quantitative man-
agement and the polluter-pays principle for pollution control. Id. 
 138. Recognition of the right to water has been debated in a number of in-
ternational law fora. The right to water is a crucial element in the work of 
the Human Rights Council, the U.N. General Assembly, many scholars, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In September 2010, a resolution 
adopted by consensus by the Human Rights Council affirmed that the right to 
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recognition of such a right would be a first good step, but 
should be followed by effective policy implementation and en-
forcement.139 
                                                                                                                            
water and sanitation is recognized in existing international law. See Human 
Rights Council Res. 15/L.14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/L.14 (Sept. 24, 2010). In 
2010, China voted in favor of a U.N. General Assembly resolution recognizing 
the right to water as a human right. G.A. Res. 64/292, The Human Right to 
Water and Sanitation (Aug. 3, 2010). This Resolution acknowledges that 
clean drinking water and sanitation are integral to the realization of all hu-
man rights. Accordingly, the right to water imposes a burden on China to 
develop new policies and rules to ensure safe drinking water for its popula-
tion. However, the resolution does not have a legally binding effect, and is 
generally regarded as a soft law legal instrument. The vote in favor of the 
U.N. General Assembly resolution is an important first step, but China 
should pursue formal recognition of the right to water in international and 
domestic laws in order to grant its citizens legal entitlement against the state 
in case of serious interferences with the enjoyment of the right to water, 
which requires the state to adopt, inter alia, effective legislation to restrain 
third parties from polluting water resources. Jade Harsha, Conflicts and Di-
lemma of Human Right to Water, 100 CURRENT SCI. 1178, 1778 (2011). It is 
nevertheless uncertain what incentives China has to take such a step, and 
whether this scenario is plausible at all. In fact in China new regulations 
have been adopted to protect the environment, but lack of control and en-
forcement measures remains a crucial problem. Recognition of the right to 
water within the national political and legal systems by way of legislative 
implementation would constitute a step in the right direction, but it should 
be accompanied by monitoring and enforcement measures. The right to water 
is not recognized at the constitutional level in China. Article 9 of the Consti-
tution of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Xianfa, Di Jiu Tiao] states: 
mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland, unre-
claimed land, beaches and other natural resources are owned by the 
State, that is, by the whole people, with the exception of the forests, 
mountains, grasslands, unclaimed land, and beaches that are owned 
by collectivities in accordance with the law. The State ensures the 
rational use of natural resources and protects rare animals and 
plants. The appropriation or damage of natural resources by any or-
ganization or individual by whatever means is prohibited. 
As previously mentioned, provisions on supply and sanitation are included in 
secondary resources, inter alia, P.R.C. Law on Prevention and Control of Wa-
ter Pollution, supra note 62. William C. Jones, The Constitution of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 707 (1985). 
 139. Peter Gleick, China and Water, in THE WORLD’S WATER: THE BIENNIAL 
REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 79, 94-95 (Peter H. Gleick et al. eds., 
2008). 
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Many factors contributed to the currently weak enforcement 
of environmental regulations in China. The breakthrough of 
shale gas exploration and production in China is undermined 
by the country’s unsatisfactory record on environmental en-
forcement, which jeopardizes the capacity of existing laws to 
both prevent and minimize the downsides of hydraulic fractur-
ing.140 China relies on a multilevel system of authority based 
on central supervision of local governments to guarantee ade-
quate legal enforcement. Environmental regulations are ac-
cordingly enforced at the local level through central Govern-
ment Regional Supervision Centers (“RSCs”) and local govern-
ments’ Environmental Protection Bureaus, which are responsi-
ble for supervising the implementation of central laws, investi-
gating major pollution events, coordinating and settling trans-
boundary environmental disputes, and receiving and respond-
ing to complaints.141 However, the efficiency of the government 
RSCs is weakened by several constraints. The RSCs are ex-
tremely underfunded, which results in weak governmental en-
forcement capacity, and are financed by local governments, 
causing conflicts of interest, corruption, and complicity.142 
Moreover, the RSCs lack enforcement authority over local gov-
ernment Environmental Protection Bureaus. To overcome 
these hindrances, the RSC’s role should be reinforced by 
providing specific legal tools and conferring to the centers more 
adequate funding and greater powers. 
B. Transparency and Disclosure about Fracking Activities: 
Evaluating the Chinese and U.S. Approaches 
Other factors not limited to the area of water pollution con-
trol and prevention contribute to current weak law enforce-
ment in China. In particular, the existing legal instruments 
lack enforcement mechanisms and procedures, namely supervi-
sion, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation. The enforcement of 
environmental laws could be improved through legal instru-
ments that facilitate access of the general public to information 
and statistics in order to foster a positive feedback mechanism 
                                                                                                                            
 140. See generally Wang, supra note 69. 
 141. Scott Moore, Commentary: Shifting Power in Central-Local Environ-
mental Governance in China: The Regional Supervision Centers, 11 CHINA 
ENV’T SERIES 188, 188 (2011). 
 142. Id. at 191. 
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that could exercise greater pressure on local or central govern-
ment to enforce existing regulations.143 
These transparency measures have already contributed to 
filling the gap between central and regional regulations for the 
oil industry in both the United States and China. In 1986, the 
United States adopted the Emergency Planning and Right to 
Know Act (EPCRA),144 which fosters and promotes emergency 
preparedness by asking local and federal governments to publi-
cize precise information about the presence of potential chemi-
cal risks.145 Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) Toxic Release Inventory (“TRI”)146 maintains a searcha-
ble database of toxic chemical releases and waste-management 
activities whose aim is to inform and guide policy decisions of 
local communities and federal government, enhancing partici-
patory mechanisms. However, U.S. shale gas companies are 
not required by federal law to disclose the chemicals being used 
for hydraulic fracturing. Although to date, eleven states have 
passed laws requiring drilling companies to reveal some, 
though not all, of the chemicals they use. The U.S. Groundwa-
ter Protection Council and Department of Energy (DOE) have 
also developed a web-based national registry called “FracFo-
cus,” which allows the public to access information, on a well-
by-well basis, on chemical constituents used in hydraulic frac-
turing.147 Moreover in some states, such as Texas148 and Colo-
                                                                                                                            
 143. Ma Jun, The Power of Public Disclosure, CHINA DIALOGUE (Dec. 13, 
2010) https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4001-The-power-
of-public-disclosure. 
 144. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 40 
C.F.R. §§ 355, 370, 372 (2015); EPCRA: Section 313, E.P.A. Doc. 260/K-
010001 (Feb. 2001). 
 145. EPCRA §§ 311–12 (2011). 
 146. TRI was established in 1986 by the EPCRA. In 1990, Congress passed 
the Pollution Prevention Act (PPA), which required that facilities report addi-
tional data on waste management and source reduction activities under TRI. 
The TRI-specific sections of these two laws are Section 313 of the EPCRA and 
Section 6607 of the PPA. Toxic Release Inventory Program, UNITED STATES 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-
program (last updated Mar. 14, 2016). 
 147. On the role of FracFocus and its implications, see generally Leah A. 
Dundon, Mark Abkowitz & Janey Camp, The Real Value of FracFocus as a 
Regulatory Tool: A National Survey of State Regulators, 87 ENERGY POL’Y  496 
(2015); Katherine Konschnik & Archana Dayalu, Hydraulic Fracturing 
Chemicals Reporting: Analysis of Available Data and Recommendations for 
Policymakers, 88 ENERGY POL’Y  504 (2016). 
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rado,149 disclosure on FracFocus is a mandatory legislative re-
quirement. The case against mandating the disclosure of hy-
draulic fracturing chemicals is that “[t]he specific make-up of 
the chemicals used in fracturing in particular is considered 
proprietary information and should be protected.”150 Converse-
ly, it should be kept in mind that considerable knowledge gaps 
about the effects of hydraulic fracturing on water, hence public 
health, still exist. 
One embryonic tendency in the United States is that shale 
gas operators are starting to voluntarily publish the chemicals 
employed in their hydraulic fracturing processes. For instance, 
Aubrey McClendon (Former President and Chief Executive Of-
ficer of Chesapeake Energy) and John Pinkerton (Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer of Range Resources Inc.) have spec-
ified that their companies will make publicly available a list of 
chemicals used.151 In 2009, in regards to legislative responses, 
the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act 
(FRAC Act) was proposed in attempts to close the loophole ex-
empting companies drilling for natural gas from disclosing the 
chemicals involved in fracking operations that would normally 
be required under federal clean water laws.152 An attempt was 
made to introduce the FRAC Act in 2009, and on March 15, 
2011, U.S. Representatives Diana DeGette and Jared Polis re-
introduced it to Congress.153 Congress had not yet passed either 
                                                                                                                            
 148. The Texas legislature enacted legislation in mid-2011 that directed the 
Texas Railroad Commission (which regulates oil and gas activity in Texas) to 
draft regulations that require companies to disclose fracturing fluid composi-
tion on a well-by-well basis by posting information on FracFocus. The Com-
mission complied with the directive, enacting such regulations in December 
2011. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.851(a)(1)(A) (West 2012). 75; TEX. 
ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (2012). 
 149. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A (2012). 
 150. Deweese, supra note 118, at 11. 
 151. Id. at 12–13; see also Timothy Gardner & Sarah N. Lynch, Despite 
Probe, SEC Says Not Regulating Fracking, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2011, 3:58 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/us-usasec-fracking-
idUSTRE78E5NK20110915. 
 152. On the FRAC Act, see generally SUSAN L. SAKMAR, ENERGY FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS 
(LNG) 316 (2013). 
 153. David O. Williams, DeGette, Polis Once Again Introduce FRAC Act to 
Bring Federal Oversight to Gas Fracking, COLO. INDEP. (Mar. 15, 2011, 5:47 
PM), http://coloradoindependent.com/79273/degettepolis-once-again-
introduce-frac-act-to-bring-federal-oversight-to-gas-fracking. 
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of the FRAC Act bills. This bill was reassigned as number S. 
785 to a congressional committee on March 18, 2015, which will 
consider the bill before possibly sending it on to the House or 
Senate as a whole.154 
In China, transparency initiatives are growing in order to 
tackle information shortcomings. The Water Law155 requires 
the environmental protection administration departments of 
the local people’s governments to periodically disclose pollution 
quantity control targets.156 This legal tool also requires the En-
vironmental Protection Administration Department of the 
State Council and local governments to “name and shame” local 
governments157 who fail to meet their quantity control tar-
gets.158 The first ministry-level disclosure law is the Measures 
on Open Environmental Information (for Trial Implementa-
tion) was passed on February 8, 2007, by the MEP in order to 
foster public participation in fighting pollution.159 The 
measures require companies to timely and accurately disclose 
their environmental information160 and promote citizen in-
volvement, in that “citizens, legal persons and other organiza-
                                                                                                                            
 154. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 
785, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s785. 
 155. See P.R.C. Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, supra 
note 62. 
 156. Id. art. 19. 
 157. Even before the Water Law was approved, some laws fostering trans-
parency and public participation had been adopted, such as the Clean Pro-
duction Law of 2003, which required emissions and other environmental da-
ta. Furthermore, the Environmental Impact Assessment Law of 2003 re-
quires partial public disclosure of the environmental impact assessments 
completed for permit applications. P.R.C. Law on Environmental Impact As-
sessment (promulgated by Order No. 77 of the President of the People’s Re-
public of China, Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Measures on Open Environmental Information (for Trial Implementa-
tion) (adopted by the State Environmental Protection Administration of Chi-
na, Feb. 8, 2007, effective May 1, 2008). 
 160. Article 4 provides: 
Environmental protection departments shall observe the principles 
of justice, fairness, convenience to the people and objectivity and dis-
close government environmental information promptly and accurate-
ly. Enterprises shall disclose enterprise environmental information 
promptly and accurately under the principle of combining voluntary 
disclosure with mandatory disclosure. 
Id. art. 4. 
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tions” are allowed to “ask environmental protection depart-
ments to obtain government environmental information.”161 
Despite the progress made by Chinese local governments re-
garding transparency and disclosure of environmental infor-
mation, differences among provinces and regions remain. In 
particular, disclosure of the environmental impact by large en-
ergy companies is limited, and, being big taxpayers, the gov-
ernment generally sits by when they refuse to disclose their 
environmental information. Another hurdle is related to the 
normative nature of these regulations, which do not usually 
impose mandatory environmental disclosure requirements on 
enterprises, but merely encourage companies to take their own 
initiative in providing information. 
Environmental disclosure and transparency directly affect 
social acceptance, which is a key element for the long-term suc-
cess of shale gas development, as previous North American ex-
perience shows.162 It is crucial to developing mutual-trust and 
mutual-benefit relations between the shale gas industry and 
local communities. This would minimize the social risk for the 
developer, while involving the community in the decision-
making process, and ensuring tangible and equitable benefits 
from the project. In this vein, strong transparency initiatives 
and mandatory disclosure of environmental information repre-
sents a crucial step towards safer regulation of shale gas devel-
opment and better enforcement of domestic environmental 
laws. 
                                                                                                                            
 161. Id. art. 5. 
 162. On this point, see Eleanor Bayley, Conflict Sensitivity of the Shale Gas 
Industry, NEWCLIMATEFORPEACE.ORG, (Sept. 17, 2015), 
https://www.newclimateforpeace.org/blog/nrm-and-conflict-%E2%80%93-
conflict-sensitivity-shale-gas-industry. Bayley states, 
Where there is a lack of disclosure from companies over policies and 
plans for meeting environmental standards and strong opposition 
from environmental groups, coupled with only nascent independent 
research and analysis on the environmental impacts of fracking and 
strong national and international anti-fracking campaigns can result 
in mis-information, thus clouding effective discussion and contrib-
uting to company-community misunderstanding and conflict. 
Id. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES: A MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT FOR THE 
UNCONVENTIONAL GAS MARKET? 
Although there are clear differences between China and the 
United States in the context of shale gas, further analysis re-
veals important similarities. Shale gas is a pivotal factor for 
the future of energy in both countries, where energy security, 
energy efficiency, and environmental concerns are deeply inter-
twined. These two countries strive to guarantee greater energy 
security by boosting domestic resources.163 Additionally, their 
regulatory frameworks share similarities, as both have far-
reaching federal or central laws enforced by designated agen-
cies. Furthermore, both countries exhibit a gap between the 
formulation of federal or central law and their enforcement at 
the local level. These similarities between the U.S. and Chinese 
energy systems allow for the drawing of parallels that could be 
beneficial to the Chinese shale gas industry.164 
For the purposes of this article, it is useful to analyze the fac-
tors that allowed the United States to trigger what is called the 
“shale revolution.”165 Shale gas industry development has deep-
ly altered the U.S. energy scenario, allowing the transition 
from energy shortage to energy abundance, and the country—
globally at the top of the list for energy consumption—could 
                                                                                                                            
 163. See generally INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK SPECIAL 
REPORT: ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2015), 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weo-2015-
special-report-energy-climate-change.html. 
 164. However, the two countries have different geological characteristics. 
Hydraulic fracturing in China is much more geographically challenging than 
it is in the United States, mainly because Chinese shale gas is found in much 
rougher and deeper terrain than U.S. shale gas. Hence, the expertise derived 
from the U.S. shale industry may not be directly adaptable to China, as it 
would demand more experienced staff, supplementary equipment, technologi-
cal innovation and augmented costs. Additionally, the quality of the shale 
rock and gas in China is also different than that in the United States, as it is 
more difficult to be fractured and contains much more non-hydrocarbon gas-
ses. This means that Chinese shale gas is of a lower quality, and consequen-
tially may be costly in the long-term, as China may be compelled to define 
ways to render the gas more usable. See generally, Liu Honglin, The Drilling 
and Completion Technology of Shale Gas and Its Status Reservoir Stimula-
tion Technology in Foreign, and Our Adaptive Analysis, in SENIOR SYMPOSIUM 
OF NATIONAL OIL AND GAS WELL ENGINEERING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRESS 
AND DRILLING ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY (2009) (in Chinese). 
 165. STEVENS, supra note 17. 
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soon become the main hydrocarbon producer.166 Shale gas is 
already influencing global energy relationships by replacing oil 
in the new global energy balance, and its impact will be even 
clearer when its first export starts in 2017.167 In the United 
States there are many liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) platforms, 
which originally were built to import gas but are now being 
converted for shale gas export, if possible towards Europe, In-
dia, and China. This shift aimed to widen the political and 
commercial sphere of influence of the United States in global 
energy safety and related geopolitical relationships, as well as 
for reducing the near Russian and Middle Eastern monopoly in 
the natural gas industry.168 The shale gas revolution has al-
tered hydrocarbon-production economic assets in the United 
States, reducing dependency on imports and strengthening the 
domestic manufacturing sector, thanks to reduced energy 
costs.169 It is therefore useful to analyze the factors that have 
                                                                                                                            
 166. MARY LASHLEY BARCELLA & DAVID HOBBS, IHS CERA, FUELING NORTH 
AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE, at I-6 (2009). See also John Deutch, The Good 
News about Gas-The Natural Gas Revolution and Its Consequences, 90 
FOREIGN AFF. 82 (2011); John Deutch, The US Natural-Gas Boom Will Trans-
form the World, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2012, 6:53 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303343404577514622469426
012. As a consequence of the shale gas revolution, the North American gas 
basin, currently estimable at 3–400 billion cubic feet, could bear current en-
ergy consumption for more than one-hundred years. See Yergin, supra note 
26, at 332. 
 167. Cuckoo Paul, Will Shale Gas Trigger a New World Order?, 
FORBES INDIA (Aug. 5, 2013), http://forbesindia.com/blog/business-
strategy/will-shale-gas-trigger-a-new-world-order/#ixzz3xo2MwosF. 
 168. James T. Jensen, Presentation to the Paris Energy Club: LNG Ex-
ports from North America: How Competitive Are They Likely to Be? (May 4, 
2012). 
 169. Starting in 2007, the increase in domestic gas production has led to a 
significant gas surplus that demand could not completely absorb. As has been 
observed by the U.S. Energy Information Agency in its 2013 Annual Outlook 
on Energy: 
The US Energy Information Agency . . . forecasts that natural gas 
production in the United States will grow from 23 billions of cubic 
feet in 2011 to 33.1 billions of cubic feet in 2040, with a 44% in-
crease. Almost the entirety of this increase in domestic natural gas 
production is due to the forecast boost in shale gas production, that 
will switch from 7.8 billions of cubic feet in 2011 to 16.7 billions of 
cubic feet in 2040. 
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influenced U.S. policies on unconventional gas. Shale gas in-
dustry development in the United States has greatly benefitted 
from the regulatory regime that developed on the basis of the 
pattern of “cooperative federalism.”170 The entire process is 
governed by complex state and federal agencies that deal, re-
spectively, with drilling operations and the monitoring of water 
treatment and disposal activities. Despite this division of com-
petences, in practice the federal government has delegated a 
considerable portion of its powers to the states that provide for 
identical or better standards than the minimum ones set at the 
federal level. As a consequence, at the state level, shale gas 
regulation varies widely, depending on the specific interest and 
on political assessments in relation to the extraction of this re-
source.171 Due to this wide regulatory fragmentation, federal 
                                                                                                                            
What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, ZERORPM (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http://www.zerorpm.com/about/zerorpm-difference/blog/entry/what-is-shale-
gas-and-why-is-it-important. In 2000, shale gas represented only 1 percent of 
the U.S. natural gas demand. David Brooks, Shale Gas Revolution, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at A31. In 2012, its percentage has increased to 30 per-
cent. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 WITH 
PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at 9–10, DOE/EIA-0383 (2013). The most important 
incentive to increasing natural gas demand in the United States has been the 
electrical production achieved by replacing coal-powered plants or by increas-
ing existent production capacity. At the same time, exports have the potential 
to facilitate demand development and make the natural gas sector more com-
petitive. Finally, an increase in gas demand could be engendered by a series 
of factors, such as the use of natural gas vehicles, electricity production, and 
gas demand for industrial purposes. Kenneth W. Costello, Exploiting 
the Abundance of U.S. Shale Gas: Overcoming Obstacles to Fuel Switch-
ing and Expanding the Gas Distribution System, 34 ENERGY L.J. 542, 543–44 
(2013). 
 170. Francis Gradijan, State Regulations, Litigation, and Hydraulic Frac-
turing, 7 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 47 (2012). 
 171. For example, New York requires a comprehensive environmental im-
pact assessment, an application to gain the permission to start drilling, and a 
preventive procedure plan. In Texas, drilling permission is granted easily, 
provided that every project presented is accompanied by an environmental 
impact assessment. On the different state regulations in the United States, 
see in general David H. Getches, Groundwater Quality Protection: Setting a 
National Goal for State and Federal Programs, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 387, 410 
(1989); Mark A. Latham, The BP Deepwater Horizon: A Cautionary Tale for 
Ccs, Hydrofracking, Geoengineering and Other Emerging Technologies with 
Environmental and Human Health Risks, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
31, 56 (2011); Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 361 (2012). Such differentiation among state legislations 
becomes evident through analysis of regulation of the “Marcellus” shale gas 
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minimum standards have often been ignored or applied with a 
wide margin of discretion according to the political line of the 
concerned state.172 Standardization over this differentiated ap-
                                                                                                                            
field, where every state involved executes different regulatory frameworks, 
while complying with federal principles, which only set minimum require-
ments for fracking activities. More specifically, noxious waste and toxic chem-
ical transportation are governed by federal transport acts. The Clean Water 
Act prohibits the release of pollutants in a watercourse without specific au-
thorization. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1971). Federal law 
lays down various forms of liability for the pollution of sites intended to be 
used for well drilling, in compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA), aiming at “protecting public health and regulating the supply of 
drinkable water at the national level.” Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. 93-
523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974). Similarly, the EPA has the task to issue regula-
tions regarding fluid introduction in the subsoil, so as to protect potable sub-
terranean aquifers. Until 1997, the EPA interpreted the definition of “subter-
ranean introduction” contained in Section 300 of the SDWA as not applying 
to the subterranean storage of fluids, and excluding oil and natural gas ex-
traction techniques, including fracking. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d); Cupas, supra 
note 55, at 605–06. This interpretation was overruled in Legal Environmental 
Assistance Foundation v. U.S. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997), where 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the SDWA interpretation 
followed by the EPA was wrong, and that fracking had to be considered in-
cluded in the definition of “subterranean introduction,” and therefore subject 
to regulation. Despite this decision, in 2005, Congress amended Section 
300(d) of the SDWA in order to specifically exclude fracking. For an overview 
of the connection between the Safe Drinking Water Act and fracking, see 
Keith B. Hall, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Under the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 19 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2012); Holly A. Vandrovee, The Fight Over 
Fracking: Recent Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation in Texas, 74 TEX. B.J. 390, 
391 (2011). 
 172. This differentiated approach is clear in the recovery and disposal of 
fracturing fluid. For example, New York chose to endorse the precautionary 
principle, while Ohio and West Virginia adopted a non-intervention policy, 
and are promoting shale gas development and exploitation through a mini-
mal regulation. See generally, e.g., Hannah Wiseman, (presented 2012, 
March). State and Local Regulation of Shale Oil and Gas Development: Adap-
tation, Experimentation, or Chaos? Presentation at Conference on Federal-
ism and Energy in the United States, Searle Center, Northwestern Universi-
ty Law School, Chicago, IL. (National). Here, it is useful to refer to the fun-
damental aspects of the precautionary principle. This principle has been de-
veloped first in the environmental policy area. Already the Ministerial Decla-
ration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North 
Sea (1987) states: “in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging 
effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is neces-
sary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even be-
fore a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evi-
dence.” Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, 
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proach from state to state is desirable, especially for the regu-
lation of environmental matters.173 
                                                                                                                            
Ministerial Declaration (1987), 
http://www.vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/140155.pdf. Later, during the Third 
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (1990), a new 
Ministerial Declaration clarified the previous one: “Participating govern-
ments will continue to apply the precautionary principle, that is to take ac-
tion to avoid potentially damaging impacts of substances that are persistent, 
toxic and liable to bioaccumulate even where there is no scientific evidence to 
prove a causal link between emissions and effects.” Third International Con-
ference on the Protection of the North Sea, Ministerial Declaration (1990), 
www.vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/140228.pdf. Finally, the principle has been 
specifically legitimized in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration: “In order to 
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental deg-
radation.” U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) 
(Aug. 12, 1992). The principle was later recalled in similar terms in the Pre-
amble of the Convention on Biodiversity (1992), in Article 3 (Principles) of the 
Convention on Climate Change (1992), and in the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (September 
1992). The principles that should inspire recourse to the precautionary prin-
ciple are the following: (i) implementation of the principle should be founded 
on the most complete scientific assessment possible, which determines at 
every moment the degree of scientific uncertainty; (ii) any decision on wheth-
er to act under the precautionary principle should be preceded by an assess-
ment of the risk and of the potential consequences of not acting; and (iii) as 
soon as the results of the scientific assessments and/or of the risk assessment 
are available, all the stakeholders should have the chance to participate in 
the evaluation of the various foreseeable actions with the greatest possible 
transparency. See Giovanni Cordini, Paolo Cordini, Paolo Fois, Sergio 
Marchisio, Diritto Ambientale. Profili internazionali europei e comparati (2d 
ed. Giappichelli, 2008); Mariachiara Alberton, La quantificazione e la 
riparazione del danno ambientale nel diritto internazionale e dell’Unione 
Europea (Giuffrè, 2008). 
 173. Schauwecker reaffirms that the EPA has the duty, pursuant to the 
Water Use Efficiency and Conservation Research Act of 2009 (H.R. 631 
(111th)), to manage the risks linked to fracking, as this legislation “imposes 
on the US Environmental Protection Agency the drafting of a research and 
development programme that fosters water efficiency and conservation.” 
Schauwecker, supra note 111, at 47. Deweese affirms that by far state regu-
lation has proved to be ready and effective, and that the Congress’ efforts to 
connect fracking to the SDWA will only hold back further industrial devel-
opment of this fundamental resource. See generally Dewesee, supra note 118. 
See also Cameron Jefferies, Unconventional Bridges Over Troubled Water: 
Lessons to Be Learned from the Canadian Oil Sands as the United States 
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A. Pricing and Fiscal Regime 
In 1978, the United States implemented the Natural Gas Pol-
icy Act (NGPA),174 which entailed gradual removal of price con-
trols and supplied economic subsidies for the development of 
new natural gas sources, including for gas obtained from un-
conventional sources. Previously, the maximum price for inter-
state natural gas was set at a level that was artificially lower 
than the equilibrium price that would have arisen from free 
competition in the marketplace.175 This rate regulation pro-
duced an increase in demand and a tightening in supply, with 
consequent repercussions on natural gas stocks and on produc-
tion.176 Moreover, the NGPA contained advantageous condi-
                                                                                                                            
Moves to Develop the Natural Gas of the Marcellus Shale Play, 33 ENERGY 
L.J. 75 (2012). 
 174. Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (2015). On this matter, see 
generally Richard Greer Morgan & Martha Priddy Patterson, Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978: Four Years of Practice and Two Years to Make Perfect, 
The, 71 KY. L.J. 105 (1982); Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of Unit-
ed States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355 (1990); Rodney L. Brown, Jr., 
Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title I, 59 TEX. L. REV. 101 
(1980). 
 175. See generally Kevin L. Ward, Preemption Survives Deregulation of 
Natural Gas: Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas 
Board of Mississippi, 22 TULSA L. J. 639 (1986). 
 176. After the oil embargo in 1973 and the following “energy crisis” in 1979, 
the U.S. government fostered a large number of projects, including the 
strengthening and expansion of research and development projects linked to 
energy sources, which were later salvaged with the creation of the DOE, and 
to which has been given the task of identifying and best defining the respec-
tive responsibilities and competences of all federal energy plans and research 
and development plans. It should be noted that the first oil crisis, coinciding 
with the embargo put into effect by the Arab countries in 1973, resulted from 
the hostilities that arose between Arab countries and Israel during the Yom 
Kippur War, the fourth and last of the Israeli-Arab conflicts. In fact, for the 
first time in history, an oil-exporting country decided to use oil as a real 
weapon of war. Oil prices increased by 70 percent, reaching $5.11 per barrel. 
In addition to the price increase, an embargo was announced, and production 
fell by 5 percent in the first month, continuing with equal reductions during 
each month following. The embargo against the United States was total, as a 
reaction to the support it gave to Israel. The second oil crisis resulting from 
the Iranian revolution, took place between 1978 and 1979. Iran stopped its 
production, and the consequent oil shortage, which at first was balanced by a 
production increase by other Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) members, started to be widely felt, as Iran was globally the sec-
ond largest oil-producing country. Petroleum History of Events 1970-2000, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 2002), 
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tions for unconventional gas also in light of the very high ex-
traction costs involved.177 This partial natural gas price deregu-
lation constituted a critical advantage for the development of 
these natural resources. 
Turning to natural gas tariff regulation in China, the lack of 
a national agency responsible for pricing creates uncertainties 
in potential investors. The Chinese pricing regime for natural 
gas is a mosaic of different market and administered prices, set 
according to a number of factors.178 The Twelfth Five-Year Plan 
(2011–2015) foresees a doubling of the output of gas-fired power 
plants and an increase in the consumption of natural gas by 
households.179 This is the reason the price of natural gas is kept at 
an artificially depressed level that is lower than the international 
market price. The consequent gap with domestic prices forces Chi-
nese firms to import gas at a loss, significantly reducing the poten-
tial relevance of natural gas. The current government interven-
tion and monopoly energy prices neither reflect the scarcity of 
resources nor demand in the market. Furthermore, price dis-
tortions are not conducive to the effectiveness of market mech-
anisms and the allocation of resources, since energy prices are 
detached from the market, which forces the government to sub-
sidize certain energy industries, worsening the financial bur-
den.180 Today, China’s gas pricing is a cost-plus regime that is 
disciplined throughout the entire value chain.181 It has under-
gone some changes as the economy moves towards a market-
                                                                                                                            
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/chronology/pe
troleumchronology2000.htm. 
 177. 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (1978). 
 178. For a comparative analysis of the U.S. gas-pricing regime, see Boriss 
Siliverstovs et al., International Market Integration for Natural Gas? A Coin-
tegration Analysis of Prices in Europe, North America and Japan, 27 ENERGY 
ECON. 603 (2005). 
 179. National People Congress of China, Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-
2015), (March 2011), http://www.britishchamber.cn/content/chinas-twelfth-
five-year-plan-2011-2015-full-english-version. 
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 181. Cost-plus pricing entails that, in accordance with the value chain, the 
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based economy. In spite of this, it essentially follows a fixed-
price model, and a market-based pricing mechanism has yet to 
be developed. 
As a result, price and regulatory reform are much needed. Ex-
perimental price mechanisms have already been implemented, 
starting in December 2011, in the province of Guangdong and 
in the Guangxi region, where gas prices are no longer kept arti-
ficially lower than the market price levels, but are instead con-
nected to the market price of fuel oil and liquefied petroleum 
gas imported to Shanghai, which is a Chinese hub for gas trad-
ing and consumption.182 This trial reform overhauls the old 
pricing formation and moves toward an oil-indexation mecha-
nism. The final objective is to liberalize the wellhead price and 
establish a market-based pricing regime. It will rely on the 
concept of oil indexation to determine the gas price. By connect-
ing the price of domestic natural gas with the international 
price of its competing fuel, the oil-indexed price formula will 
mirror international market fundamentals and demand. Even-
tually the wellhead price will no longer be subject to govern-
ment-administered price, but will be set on a market basis.183 
The cost-plus regime does not provide the fundamental price 
signal that a market economy requires. A clear price signal is 
essential to reflect the market value of natural resources, to 
indicate the market trend, and to guide investment decisions. 
The low domestic price creates disincentives to upstream com-
panies from investing in Exploration and Production, thus hin-
dering the development of conventional and unconventional 
reserves.184 Furthermore, the current Chinese shale gas explo-
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ration and exploitation framework should also be improved in 
relation to the tax system, which is a critical element in in-
vestment development and in the fostering of efficient resource 
use. 
The current Chinese shale gas regulatory framework should 
be enhanced in two particular sectors, namely the fiscal and 
pricing regimes, which are key elements in fostering needed 
investments and promoting efficient use of resources. Under 
China’s production-sharing contracts, international energy 
companies must share a percentage of their profits with the 
government or government-owned companies, in addition to 
paying corporate taxes on gains.185 This creates a deterrent for 
overseas investors to invest in high-risk activity such as shale 
gas exploration and production. Conversely, the U.S. regulatory 
regime, based on royalties, requires energy firms to pay merely 
a portion of project revenues and corporate taxes on gains. 
Other factors were also important in U.S. shale gas develop-
ment. First, in the 2000s, natural gas prices were particularly 
high.186 This allowed companies to realize significant profit 
margins from drilling shale gas wells. The prospect of high 
profit margins pushed existing energy enterprises and new en-
trants to invest heavily in shale gas fields, which eventually 
pushed down natural gas prices.187 
B. Barriers to Entry and Consequences on Competition in the 
Gas Market 
The barriers to entry for small and large firms into the Amer-
ican shale gas industry were much lower than in China as in-
dividual companies were able to lease or acquire land to ex-
plore. They were only required to submit paperwork to the 
state government. 
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 186. Zhongmin Wang & Alan Krupnick, US Shale Gas Development What 
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http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-IB-13-04.pdf 
 187. Id. 
636 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2 
The North American market structure also played a decisive 
role in development of the shale gas industry, which is un-
doubtedly one of the most capital-intensive industries. It fol-
lows that small natural gas firms do not have the financial ca-
pacity and technical know-how to make substantial venture 
investments in technology. Indeed, in the United States it was 
large, independent natural gas firms that significantly invested 
in the early stage of shale gas development. Conversely, the 
major oil firms, although having the capacity, considered shale 
gas less appealing as an investment than conventional oil and 
gas. The capital market’s role was fundamental in this context, 
and contributed to pushing the shale gas boom forward by 
providing natural gas firms with copious capital to drill, and it 
also eased many transactions in which larger oil and gas en-
terprises bought out smaller firms committed to shale gas drill-
ing.188 
In China, however, the central government exerts power 
firmly on shale gas blocks by organizing auctions or granting 
exploration rights.189 This scheme creates various barriers to 
entry for both small and large overseas firms into the domestic 
shale gas industry,190 because in order to take part in auctions, 
firms had to be either Chinese or Chinese-held joint-venture 
companies, and they needed to have an extremely elevated 
minimum value.191 In particular, the approval system for for-
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(in Chinese). While a high market entry threshold may defeat China’s goal of 
attracting diversified investment and fostering competition, this practice may 
lessen environmental risks, as in China small and medium-sized companies 
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eign investments in the mineral industry, embracing any un-
derground activities, is subject to both foreign capital and in-
dustry access approval mechanisms.192 The former implies a 
multitiered administrative approval system according to which 
authorities of different levels exercise different powers over dif-
ferent industrial categories and total investment amounts. As 
for industry access, China enforces an authorization scheme for 
the exploration and exploitation of underground natural re-
sources. Specifically, the investor must apply for registration, 
hold an exploitation or exploration license, and gain the right of 
exploration and exploitation.193 
As one might expect, such a burdensome policy for foreign in-
vestments in the Chinese mineral industry is far from condu-
cive to shale gas production. Joint ventures between domestic 
and foreign companies through both inbound and outbound in-
vestments for extraction technology and potentially for infra-
structure development seem to be the best strategy in this ear-
ly stage of the shale gas industry. Obviously, Chinese re-
strictions on foreign investments constitute a relevant barrier. 
As explained above, prior to January 30, 2012, exploration and 
exploitation of shale gas in China could only be carried out by 
Chinese state-owned companies. However, according to the re-
vised Foreign Investment Industry Guidance Catalog, shale 
gas foreign investments are included in the “encouraged” cate-
gory of the catalog, allowing foreign investors to form with 
their Chinese partners Sino-foreign joint ventures and Sino-
foreign contractual (cooperative) joint ventures.194 Additionally, 
an MLR Circular issued on October 26, 2012, reaffirms that 
private Chinese oil companies may also explore for and exploit 
shale gas, including by way of creating joint ventures with for-
eign companies. The regulations do not specify a maximum 
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percentage equity shareholding that a foreign company is per-
mitted to hold in such a joint venture; however the MLR’s pub-
lic bidding invitation terms require that the Chinese party 
must have a majority ownership.195 Furthermore, investors will 
likely wait to see what shale gas-pricing policies and govern-
ment support mechanisms are put in place before actually in-
vesting in Chinese shale gas, as uncertainty and regulatory 
changes might have detrimental effects on them.196 
In this context, it should be pointed out that the absence of 
competition in the energy market generates an unfair alloca-
tion of resources. In fact, in 2001, China joined the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and consequently must increase 
competitiveness of state-owned energy companies while re-
straining national control over energy companies.197 At the 
moment, there is no actual competition between the three ma-
jor Chinese oil companies, as they have the same, single share-
holder, i.e., the State-owned Assets Supervision and Admin-
istration Commission of the State Council (“SASAC”). Indeed, 
there is no competition in either the upstream or downstream 
energy sectors, as they feature market monopolies and admin-
istrative price guides,198 regardless of the fact that both the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) and the 2012 Energy 
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White Paper call for the introduction of private-capital and 
market mechanisms, which would terminate the current ener-
gy monopoly that exacerbates lack of supervision and ineffi-
ciency.199 The only way China could improve its future energy 
policy is by converting nonmarket mechanisms to market 
mechanisms, adopting a modern corporate system for energy 
companies, and changing the government management system 
from strict controls to limited supervision.200 
Another aspect that has certainly advanced the growth in 
shale gas development in the United States is its distinctive 
market structure for gas transportation. In particular, “owner-
ship of transportation capacity rights is unbundled from own-
ership of the pipeline itself.”201 This makes it possible for many 
of the small producers that first ventured into shale to access 
the market through a competitive bid for pipeline capacity. 
This is an inherent problem affecting market access in China, 
where pipeline capacity is bundled to facility ownership, and 
large incumbent state-owned enterprises dominate the entire 
transportation infrastructure. 
C. Mineral Rights Ownership Regulation 
Another fundamental element of the present comparative 
analysis is the land and mineral rights ownership regime. In 
the United States, shale gas development has taken place 
mainly on private land.202 Private land ownership allowed nat-
ural gas firms a way to ensure reasonable returns from their 
early investments in technology innovations through acquiring 
land, proving its potential, and then selling it. Private mineral 
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rights ownership creates a constituency favoring drilling and 
helps restrain the temptation of governments to raise revenues 
through shale gas drilling.203 China has auctioned off drilling 
blocks, and has required a certain minimum investment to de-
velop auctioned blocks within a certain period of time.204 In 
theory, this should force firms to drill but it is not clear wheth-
er this mechanism would offer a sufficient incentive to inno-
vate. On the other hand, private land ownership carries the 
risk that some speculating energy companies may rent large 
areas of land without making appropriate investments. In Chi-
na, below-ground mineral rights are owned by the state. State 
ownership can back operators piecing together contiguous 
blocks of land, achieving a more efficient and unhindered ex-
ploitation of a gas field. Moreover, the government can lease 
the drilling rights at below-market rates if it wishes to. 
A further element to be analyzed is the legal regime concern-
ing water-rights regulation in the United States.205 A mineral 
lease to a shale gas operator generally comprises the details of 
what consumption the operator can make of water on the sur-
face of the property, and the specific lease terms will govern 
the relationship between the surface fee owner and mineral 
rights holder.206 Customarily, these contracts allow water to be 
employed for operating on the premises and the owner or oper-
ator can use a reasonable quantity of water so long as other ri-
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parian rights holders are not prejudiced in their use.207 In fact, 
the reasonable use doctrine renders “virtually all uses of water 
made upon the land from which it is extracted . . . ‘reasonable,’ 
even if they more or less deplete the supply to the harm of 
neighbors, unless the purpose is malicious or the water is simp-
ly wasted.”208 Some states comprising the Marcellus Shale, 
namely New York and Ohio, have implemented a “regulated 
riparian” pattern to deal with these unclear provisions.209 Con-
versely, Pennsylvania and West Virginia depend heavily on 
common law regulatory precedents, and have yet to pass per-
mitting procedures.210 
D. Pipeline Network 
Moreover, in the United States, an extensive and sophisticat-
ed network of natural gas pipelines existed before shale gas be-
came a major gas resource. Fundamental in this context was 
the policy of open access to interstate natural gas pipelines (as 
well as storage facilities) resulting from a series of Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders in the 1980s and 
early 1990s.211 In the following years, significant technological 
advances enabled a surge in investment in the production of 
shale gas, which determined a surge in supply coupled with 
strong demand driven by sustainable low natural gas prices.212 
This constituted an exciting opportunity for energy infrastruc-
ture providers. Today, infrastructure investors benefit from at-
tractive opportunities, relatively stable low-risk cash flows un-
derpinned by long-term contracts, and growth perspectives 
stemming from the need for expanded pipeline capacity. This 
scenario has increased the potential for attractive returns and 
represents a crucial case for investment in energy infrastruc-
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ture across the gas supply chain. In the United States, inves-
tors rely on provisions of pipeline infrastructure that are gen-
erally predicated on stable, fee-based revenues, largely insulat-
ed from direct commodity price exposure. Additionally, more 
than half of the top midstream pipeline enterprises have 
adopted a “master-limited partnership” structure as an effec-
tive alternative to a corporate structure.213 This partnership 
model does not pay corporate tax, which has contributed to 
promoting investment in the shale gas industry.214 
Although China has a considerable reserve estimate, the de-
velopment of shale gas as a key element of the country’s energy 
mix may be undermined by the lack of adequate physical infra-
structure, mainly gas pipelines for transport and delivery. 
Large-scale pipelines will have to be built to manage the capac-
ity of targeted output and to transport the product from the 
major gas fields, which could be challenging for smaller explo-
ration and production firms.215 In particular, there is no inte-
grated national gas grid, and most of China’s infrastructures 
were constructed to transport its most important fuel, coal.216 
Currently all principal gas transmission lines are owned by the 
state,217 and a number of new pipelines are needed. Developing 
transportation and storage facilities is crucial for shale gas ex-
pansion, and even though much still needs to be done, China 
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plans to build 14,400 miles of new gas pipelines between 2010 
and 2016 to reinforce the current 21,000-mile network.218 In 
addition, China will need to construct or reinforce infrastruc-
tures that can safely dispose of the contaminated material used 
to fracture the shale rock, and thus protect the environment. 
Energy expert Diana Ngo stresses that these factors are im-
portant because they will reduce costs caused by environmental 
damage occurring in the future.219 Additionally, these precau-
tionary steps will also help China exponentially speed up its 
well-development timeline (for instance, PetroChina took a 
lengthy period of eleven months to complete the country’s first 
horizontal well).220 
E. The Politics of Shale: Grounds for International Cooperation 
Shale gas development has deeply modified the energy sce-
nario in the United States from a status of shortage to that of 
plenty. Already the world’s biggest energy consumer, the Unit-
ed States may soon become the largest producer of hydrocar-
bons.221 As a consequence of the shale gas revolution, North 
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America’s natural gas base, now estimated at 3400 trillion cu-
bic feet, could provide for current levels of consumption for over 
one-hundred years.222 Shale gas, replacing oil as the principal 
agent of a new global energy equilibrium, is already transform-
ing global energy relations, and the impact will be more evi-
dent when gas exports begin (the first LNG exports are ex-
pected to start around 2017).223 There are several LNG termi-
nals located in the United States, originally constructed to im-
port gas, which are now looking to start exporting possibly to 
Europe, India, and China, as a way to extend their sphere of 
influence while reducing the dominance of the Middle East and 
Russia in the gas sector. The shale gas revolution has modified 
the economics of oil and gas production in the United States, 
reducing dependence on imported oil and gas supplies and rein-
forcing domestic manufacturing through lower energy costs. 
Over the last decade, the political attitude towards shale gas 
has been changing, and more consideration is given to concerns 
regarding shale’s potential detrimental effects on the environ-
ment, and in particular water sources. Accordingly, the Obama 
administration plans to enforce more stringent controls over 
drillers by forcing them to seize emissions of determined air 
pollutants from new wells beginning in 2015.224 The rapid de-
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velopment of shale gas in the United States has nevertheless 
stoked environmental controversy and debate. The suitability 
of taking the U.S. regulatory framework as a model scheme 
remains debatable because the United States is experiencing 
difficulties with environmental aspects related to shale gas ex-
traction,225 in particular given the complex barriers that devel-
oping countries such as China are facing in this sector. Never-
theless, it is likely that a comparative analysis might contrib-
ute to resolving some of these issues. 
Large-scale production of shale gas in the United States is al-
ready transforming worldwide dynamics of the gas industry. 
The rapid growth of this new resource created a global surplus 
of LNG, whose rapid buildup coincided with the emergence of 
shale gas as a new supply source.226 Until 2010, the United 
States was supposed to be the greatest LNG market due to a 
projected domestic shortfall. Conversely, shale gas increase 
may transform the United States into an LNG exporter, leav-
ing much LNG in search of a market that will be only partially 
absorbed by growing Asia. This over-supply of LNG fostered 
wider competition among gas suppliers and reduced prices. It is 
also modifying the economic and political equilibrium stem-
ming from a new, wider geopolitical impact of the global gas 
market, which is engendering new gas competition.227 As shale 
gas expands globally, we should assess the possible conse-
quences of price development in relation to the potential estab-
lishment of an Organization of Gas Exporting Countries 
(OGEC), stemming from the Gas Exporting Countries Forum 
(GECF), a gas-exporting countries forum with headquarters in 
Doha, Qatar (which is the main gas supplier to Europe, after 
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Russia).228 In particular, if gas prices further lower reducing 
exporters’ revenues, this would constitute an incentive for an 
OGEC to take the lead and defend falling prices.229 It remains 
to be seen to what extent the GECF will develop into an OGEC. 
It is not clear how such a cartel would fix the gas price, possi-
bly enacting price-fixing mechanisms or imposing production 
quantitative restrictions. In reality, traded gas is often subject 
to long-term contracts that feature rigid pricing terms support-
ed by international commercial provisions. As one might ex-
pect, government interference in pricing terms would amount 
to a breach of such agreements, triggering international arbi-
tration in order to settle the contractual dispute. 
On a different level, U.S. President Barack Obama and for-
mer Chinese General Secretary Hu Jintao acknowledged the 
importance of fostering cooperation in shale gas development 
by establishing an agreement in the form of the Global Shale 
Gas Resource Initiative (GSGI) in November 2009. This agree-
ment provides U.S. assistance to assess, develop, and promote 
investment in shale gas reserves, and to help develop opera-
tional best practices and effective environmental safeguards.230 
The goal of the GSGI is to assist countries seeking to develop 
their own unconventional gas resources while balancing energy 
security and environmental concerns.231 So far, partnerships 
have been arranged with India, Poland, and China. Chinese 
state-owned gas producers have entered into major transac-
tions with large international players to develop shale gas re-
serves in China and to exploit shale gas reserves in Western 
Canada and the United States.232 
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Whether the GSGI can provide a regulatory model to develop 
unconventional natural gas resources in an environmentally 
sensitive manner remains to be seen. In that respect, appropri-
ateness of the U.S. legal framework as a model scheme is still 
debatable, given the problem that shale gas is creating in the 
United States, especially in relation to the environment. While 
good progress on the exploration and development aspects of 
this agreement has been made, environmental cooperation is 
still lacking. This is in part due to the fact that the United 
States is still struggling to design the most adequate domestic 
regulatory framework for safeguards. Environmental protec-
tion is not the priority for either side, as they do not want to 
jeopardize the potential of China’s shale gas by firmly pursuing 
environmental protection. At the same time, U.S. energy com-
panies engaged in these bilateral exploration and development 
projects aimed at exchanging assessment and extraction tech-
nology for gaining Chinese commercial market access. On the 
other side, China strives to transfer technology from the United 
States, which often implies intellectual property rights con-
cerns.233 
Almost all fracking technology and experience are owned by 
U.S. companies, and China needs to learn from them in order 
to develop its own shale gas services and industry. To this end, 
Chinese oil companies have already started investing in the 
U.S. shale market. Namely, CNOOC has joined with Chesa-
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peake Energy on production ventures,234 and Sinopec partnered 
with Devon Energy in a similar deal.235 These agreements were 
minority interests in actual gas production, and constituted in-
vestments to export fracking know-how and technologies 
through participation in the exploration and production 
team.236 However, the way China will overcome the technology 
and experience barriers is still open to debate. U.S. techniques 
are not very mature, and may fail to answer China’s know-how 
needs. Also, Chinese shale gas is found in deeper reserves, 
while shale gas in the United States is mostly distributed in 
plains and hidden shallowly.237 The hidden depth and the pecu-
liar geological context make China’s exploitation much more 
challenging. Moreover, given that China’s ultimate goal is to 
achieve and maintain energy security by developing its domes-
tic natural resources, it cannot exclusively bid on U.S. technol-
ogy and expertise. Accordingly, it will continue to invest in ma-
jor foreign energy companies (as happened with Chesapeake 
Energy and Devon Energy), and then it will import early mod-
els of hydraulic fracturing in order to develop its own domestic 
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model of fracking technology by reverse engineering the tech-
nology.238 
U.S. companies have a strong interest in supporting bilateral 
environmental protection efforts, as a shale gas environmental 
accident in China would not only affect the Chinese economy, 
but would also augment opposition to fracking in the United 
States.239 Moreover, if China does not comply with best practic-
es in capturing GHG, shale gas development will increase Chi-
na’s emissions instead of reducing them. Further efforts are 
needed to guarantee that China optimizes the advantages from 
shale gas development, that is to say decreasing oil imports 
and pollution, while reducing the environmental hazards. 
Within U.S.-China bilateral cooperation on shale gas develop-
ment, a collaborative dialogue has already commenced, engag-
ing governments, NGOs, the private sector, researchers, and 
academia. This exchange should be reinforced, and China 
should focus on importing and developing environmentally-
friendly technologies, best practices, and a comprehensive 
regulatory framework to foster safe and secure exploitation of 
its shale gas resources. 
V. THE PROSPECTS FOR SHALE GAS IN CHINA BETWEEN 
REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS AND NEW GEOPOLITICAL 
BALANCES 
As shale gas radically impacts the supply and demand of the 
world’s energy mix and market, new geopolitical factors must 
be assessed, taking into account that, as far as China is con-
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cerned, economic and demographic growth will increase pres-
sure on global energy supplies, and thus all fuel sources will 
have to be exploited.240 China has historically depended on fuel 
imports from politically sensitive regions, restraining its for-
eign policy options.241 This predominant dependence on foreign 
energy poses different risks: disruptions to its imported energy, 
sustained and extremely volatile energy prices and a clash be-
tween China’s foreign policy interests and its overseas energy 
interests.242 Copious shale gas production can help the country 
acquire security of energy supply, which could lead to both a 
dramatic and radical change in its relationships with other na-
tions. The emergence of this new resource in North America is 
already changing the dynamics of the global gas business and 
energy geopolitics, demonstrating that the gas market is truly 
global.243 
Indeed, the energy market is currently affected by a surplus 
of production. The principal cause of this surplus originates in 
the mass production of shale gas from the United States, which 
is now closer to the goal of energy independence. Energy de-
mand cannot absorb this excess in resources produced, particu-
larly as demand has decreased because of the current global 
economic recession, especially in Europe. In other words, U.S. 
investment in the industry of fracking is bearing fruit for which 
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there is excess supply of oil and gas in a time in history when 
the global economy is struggling to recover.244 
The excess production has caused a collapse in oil prices and 
natural gas, which has not, however, been followed by an effort 
by Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
to cut production. International experts in the energy market 
are trying to understand the reasons behind this strategy. One 
hypothesis, which sees in the failure to cut production by 
OPEC an attempt to exclude from the market competition of 
U.S. shale gas, is far-fetched. Indeed, hydrocarbons extracted 
from shale rock in the United States produce income at prices 
between $40 and $115, implying that, if OPEC could keep 
crude oil at $70 per barrel, competition of shale gas in the 
United States would be strongly affected.245 Such a pricing 
strategy would slow the development of the new generation of 
western mining technologies that are slowly eroding the bar-
gaining and geopolitical power of the members of OPEC.246 Pro-
tracted low prices would produce a financial return which 
would defeat the costly investment required for starting the 
production of shale gas and would create further instability. 
From a different perspective, shale gas can be a strategic tool 
to discourage the rise of the political risk that the global oil 
market is facing, while reducing “dependence on the US and 
Chinese natural gas reserves of the Middle East, limiting the 
incentives for geopolitical competition and trade between the 
two main consuming countries and providing both new oppor-
tunities to diversify their energy reserves.”247 
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In the light of the analysis above, some essential elements of 
potential Chinese shale gas development should be pointed out. 
First, there is a need to design a comprehensive and conducive 
regulatory environment, legally implemented, which would 
take into consideration the environmental hazards related to 
shale gas exploration and production. Shale gas production in 
China is in its infancy, and a sound regulatory system is re-
quired to assure long-term exploitation. Overarching effective 
unitary regulation would reduce uncertainty in the gas market 
and foster future investments offering attractive terms to pri-
vate investors.248 Second, China needs to tackle its unsatisfac-
tory record of environmental enforcement which jeopardizes 
the capacity of existing laws to prevent the downside of hy-
draulic fracturing. This can be accomplished through adoption 
of transparency initiatives and mandatory disclosure of envi-
ronmental information. This would also help reduce the friction 
between Beijing’s concerns over energy security and opposition 
by reluctant local communities worried about the environmen-
tal costs of shale gas exploration and extraction. Infrastructure 
development and technology transfer are equally needed, and 
the previous experience of the United States in this sector can 
be of great help to the development of Chinese shale gas indus-
try. As part of this strategy, China’s Ministry of Resources has 
invited some major oil and gas companies to pitch for shale gas 
exploration work, granting licenses for exploration in western 
China.249 
The Chinese national political climate for shale gas appears 
to be positive as well. In March 2012, the first five-year shale 
gas development plan for the period 2011–2015 was jointly re-
leased by the NDRC, the MOF, the Ministry of Land and Re-
sources, and the National Agency of Energy. It called for devel-
opment of a policy framework for regulation of the country’s 
shale gas sector, and it ambitiously estimated that production 
would reach 80 billion cubic feet in 2020 from production at the 
time of zero.250 In this vein, according to the plan, China will 
develop projects for the “assessment for shale and confirming 
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the current reserve estimates.”251 A National Shale Gas Devel-
opment Program has been adopted, in which great importance 
is given to research and development for technology, explora-
tion, and development of shale gas in light of the Thirteenth 
Five Year Plan (2016–2020), which will greatly emphasize the 
importance of exploring unconventional and alternative energy 
sources. As long as China is pursuing joint ventures with for-
eign enterprises to acquire know-how in shale gas exploration 
and extraction, it seems probable that its leadership will con-
tinue to encourage shale gas commercial exploitation. An actu-
al shale gas market is expected to develop over an extended 
period of time; and although government support appears 
sound, it is hard to foresee how the market will shape until ma-
jor policy decisions on pricing, infrastructure development, and 
competition have been announced. 
It is in this context of uncertainty that we should see the 
agreement signed in May 2014, in Shanghai and Russia (or ra-
ther, by the two state-owned energy companies, CNPC. It is a 
thirty-year agreement that is binding on Russia to provide to 
China 38 billion cubic meters of gas per year starting in 
2018.252 The still uncertain forecasts for exploitation of uncon-
ventional gas necessitate an increase in imports of natural gas. 
Following the agreement, China will be able to take advantage 
of additional supply to meet its growing demand for natural 
gas, and thus face the need to reduce the supply of coal in na-
tional energy demand, currently equal to two-thirds of it.253 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, successful shale gas development in China 
would meet domestic demand, and this new resource may grant 
China stronger bargaining power with gas exporters on issues 
such as price, which could narrow the gap between North 
American and Asian natural gas prices. The strategic signifi-
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cance of China in the shale gas revolution is undeniable in light 
of the current rise of energy prices and struggle to reduce 
harmful emissions in order to contain climate change. It re-
mains to be seen whether this “bridge fuel” will be a viable re-
source capable of contributing to greater energy security, while 
being developed in an environmentally sound manner in a 
country with a $12 trillion economy that is deeply involved in 
the global economy. 
 
